Sino-Soviet relations, 1964-1965 by Griffith, William E. & Conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (1965 : Warrenton, Va.)

Not for quotation or citation without permission
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Center for International Studies C/65-19
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1964-1965
William E. Griffith
Prepared for the Conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control
sponsored by Harvard University under contract with the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia
August 30 - September 4, 1965
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
A Brief Historical Background
All the issues in the Sino-Soviet rift have been clear since
late 1963, when the territorial, military, and alliance issues
assumed their proper place as at least as important as the more
ideological points of conflict. Consequently, neither Khrushchev's
fall nor any subsequent development has substantially modified
Sino-Soviet irreconcilability.
In the first place, Soviet retention of the territories
the Tsars annexed in Sinkiang and the Maritime Provinces and its
domination of Outer Mongolia and Chinese determination to recover
these traditional Chinese territories probably continue to make
any alliance between a strong Russia and a strong China with
its present boundaries far from permanent.
Secondly, China is an irredentist power not only to the
west and north but to the east as well. Peking regards the re-
covery of Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu, and more generally the
expulsion of American power from the shores of Asia, as one of
its vital interests. The post-Stalin Soviet leadership has pre-
ferred a detente with the strategically more powerful United
States above Sino-Soviet reconciliation (ice., they proclaim
"peaceful coexistence" and the "non-inevitability of war") and
therefore Moscow remains unwilling to accept the high level of
risk-taking vis-a-vis Washington which Peking considers essential
to achieve its vital interest of expelling America from the
Western Pacific. As a result, Moscow and Peking's common enemy,
America, serves as a divisive rather than a unifying force More
generally, the Chinese base their hopes of driving back the
Americans on the revolutionary potential of the underdeveloped,
colored areas ("the epicenter of the world revolutionary struggle")
and insist that Moscow must be willing to take the risk of
giving military aid. to revolutions in the underdeveloped colored
areas. To Moscow*s reply that this value, national liberation
struggle above the "world sociaiist system" and moreover runs
the risk of Amer~ican escalation and. therefore of general or nuclear
war (i.e., it is contrary to peaceful coexistence) the Chinese
retort that the American "paper tiger" will withdraw rather than
escalate to general warI
Thirdly, Moscow's unwillingness to give China vast economic
aid and assistance toward obtaining an atomic capacity greatly
increased the strains arising from differences in national
interests.,
Fourthly, the shared ideology, although it postponed public
polemics and. open split, made pragmatic compromise close to impos-
sible and therefore eventually speeded. up the alliance's collapse.
Fifthly, after Moscow refused Peking the massive economic
aid which alone could have made pcssible rapid Chinese industri-
alization and, on the other hand,, after Mao's short-lived hundred-
flowers experiment had scared him away from domestic liberaliza-
tion, Khrushchev and his associates remained determined to
de-Stalinize in order to enable more effective exploitation of
Soviet industrial potential. Consequently a sharp contrast de-
veloped between Moscow's and Peking's internal policies, with Mao
considering Soviet internal relaxation a direct menace to China's
maintenance of an ascetic, fanatical, labor-intensive police
state.
Thus the Chinese apparently became convinced that the Moscow
leadership was a grave threat both to Chinese national interests
and to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (between which they almost
surely do not consciously dAstinguish) and. that therefore China
must replace the Soviet Union as the head, of a new, reformed.,
orthodox (but not pluralistic) Communist movement. In order to
carry out this aim, Pek-.ng has attempted. to gain control over,
and, where it could not get control , to split into factions, the
Communist parties, first in East Asia and then throughout the
world.
The chronology of the Sino-Soviet dispute is too long and
complex to summarize here, and, Its development up to the end of
November 1963 has already been treated in detail. Several points
about it, however, are especially important for understanding the
1964-1965 developments. In my judgment the 1963 Chinese revela-
tions indicated that the "point of no return" in Sino-Soviet
relations occurred at the latest an the summer of 1959 and perhaps
1. For i962-1963, and. for a fuller reconstructed chronology
and analysis of issues,, on which this brief historical. introduc-
tion is primarily based, see William Ec Griffith, The Sino-Soviet
Rift, with bibliography (London: Allen & Unwin and Cambridge,
Mass.:2 The M.1T. Press, 1964)- For the earlier part of the dis-
pute, see Donald S Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61
(New York: Athaneum, 1964); William E. Griffith, Albania and the
Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIOT. Press, 1963); and
Alexander Dallin. ed., Diversity in International Communism (New
York:. Columbia University Press, 1963) For an enlightening
reconsideration of the historical background, see Klaus Mehnert,
Peking and Moscow (New York: Mentor, 1964).
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even before. Since then the public dispute has followed. a
cyclical course of escalation and then partial detente, each
cycle ending with Moscow-Peking relations worse than before and
with other Communist parties obtaining more autonomy from the
Soviet Union. What ostensibly have been Sino-Soviet attempts
at reconciliation have actually been tactical maneuvers intended
primarily to worsen the other's position and to gain more support
among other Communist parties. Thus the most important dynamic
characteristio of these cycles h- been the steadily accelerating
decline of Soviet influence, the increasing rise of Chinese in-
fluence, and the growth of Communist pluralism--i.e., the greater
assertion of national autonomy by other Communist parties, particu-
larly the ones previously under Soviet control.
The Chinese have found, it increasingly desirable, while
protesting their opposition to a spilt and. their desire to dis-
cuss and solve the differences, to take an ideologically adamant
policy position and to intensify their factional and splitting
activity. The Scviets, on the other hand, have increasingly
tried, to mobilize other Communist parties for collective action
against the Chinese, icec, to close off the possibility of
neutralism or passivity and, thereby to preclude the success of
Chinese factionalist activities. Most of this article will deal
with the second. such Soviet attempt, which began in early 1964.
Before turning to it, however, Moscow's unsuccessful first
attempt, in September-October 1963, must be briefly summarized.
In July 1963, after the failure of the Sino-Soviet bilateral
meeting and the Soviet signature of the partial test ban treaty,
something like a Sino-Soviet schism occurred: mutual polemics
became explicit, general, and violent, and in September 1963 the
Russians moved toward calling an international Communist meeting
for the purpose of excommunicating the Chinese.
By so doing the Soviets and the Chinese had reversed their
previous tactics; each now largely adopted the other's previous
method of crisis management. Until then the Soviets had demanded
a bilateral Sino-Soviet meeting while the Chinese had. called for
multilateral or all-party talks. By September 1963, however,
the Chinese demanded resumption first of bilateral, then of multi-
lateral, and, last, of all-party talks, and stressed "adequate
preparations," ice., delay. The Soviets, on the other hand,
after having earlier used party congresses as anti-Chinese fora,
demanded the rapid reconvening of the November 1960 26-party
editorial commission, to be followed soon thereafter by an all-
party meeting.
This simultaneous reversal of tactics reflected the changing
Sino-Soviet balance of forces. As long as the Soviets thought
that they could force the Chinese, if not to surrender, then to
retreat by mobilizing international Communist pressure against
them, ise., by demonstralting that Chinese aims were unrealizable
and that time would lead to Soviet gains (by forcing neutrals
and reluctant allies off the fence), they wanted bilateral Sino-
Soviet talks. The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted an all-party
forum so that they could demonstrate to other Communist parties
their adamancy, their rising influence, and thereby make the
danger of a split seem unacceptable. By mid-1963, however, the
Soviets had clearly become convinced (a) that the Chinese would
neither back down nor even retreat, (b) that Peking's factional
activity was so dangerously successful that Soviet influence in
the Communist world was declining, and Chinese influence rising,
with increasing rapidity and, therefore, (c) that speedy "poli-
tical isolation" of the Chinese was necessary, ice., there must
be a formal split, whereby neutrals and recalcitrants could be
forced into line and the decline of Soviet influence thereby
halted if not reversed.
The Chinese, on the other hand, were convinced that (a) the
Soviets were indeed preparing for a split and allying with Wash-
ington against them in all crucial foreign policy issues, (b)
Chinese influence was rising and a formal split might slow down
this rise, and, therefore, (c) formal international unity ( ioe I
avoidance of split) plus stepped-up factional activity within
international Communism and alliance with all non-Communist powers
outside it who were both anti-Soviet and anti-American offered
Peking the best chance for further improving its position.
Within this context, and with these reversed tactics,
Khrushchev began his first public attempt to convene an interna-
tional conference to excommunicate the Chinese in late September
1963. He did this by the "surrogate" method, i eo, by reprinting
resolutions of unconditionally pro-Soviet parties calling for
such a meeting, by censoring less favorable parts of resolutions
by other parties, and by strongly intensifying Soviet polemics
against the Chinese. Privately, the Soviet leadership brought
strong pressure on pro-Soviet parties in order to force their
public compliance with the conference plan,
But here as so often before the Soviets once again were
blocked by their chief tactical problem, They still had an assured
majority of parties, including their most powerful allies, on the
policy issues of the dispute, and in particular in favor of inter-
national detente and de-Stalinization. But their majority was
rapidly declining as their decreasing authority and increasing
record of failures emboldened their allies to assert their own
interests on the organizational issue: the degree of centralized
(i.e., Soviet) control over other Communist parties. The Soviet
plan,unfolded in September and October 1963, called for an
international conference, preceded by an editorial commission
meeting, to undertake the formal revision of the November 1960
Moscow Declaration so as to declare that the Chinese Communist
Party, not the Yugoslavs, was now the "main danger", that
priority must be given to combatting the CCP, and therefore its
"political isolation" must be brought about. To accomplish this
there must be proclaimed (as Moscow had failed to do in 1960) a
formal ban against factionalism in the international Communist
movement, and neutralism on this issue must be precluded.
By early October several moderate, conditionally pro-Soviet
parties were publicly opposing this Soviet plan. The Romanians
and Italians were the most active, but the Norwegian, Swedish,
and British Communists were also unenthusiastic, and the Poles
were also opposing behind the scenes. The Romanians probably
refused, as they did in 1964-1965, to come to such a Soviet-
arranged conference at all, and. the Italian Communists probably
refused to make a firm commitment to do so. Whether or not there
were serious differences at that time in the Soviet leadership
about Khrushchev's proposed conference remains unclear; some of
his associates probably raised doubts about the wisdom of moving
so rapidly toward such extreme goals when such important parties
as the Romanians and Italians were so recalcitrant. In any
case, on October 25, 1963 Khrushchev called for an end to Sino-
Soviet polemics and said that time would demonstrate which was
correct, Moscow or Peking. This statement, plus his omission of
any reference to a conference, indicated clearly that that Soviet
plan had for the time being been at least postponed. 2
2. The above is primarily based on Griffith, The Sino-Soviet
Rift, pp. 207-230. I have since had the opportunity of reading
an unfortunately still unpul ished manuscript by Christian Duevel
on this same episode, in which two addit 'ional important points
are made: first, sometime between September .12 and 24 there
was passed for the press the annual yearbook of the Institute
of World Academy and International Relations of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences, in which a listing of the socialist countries, for
the first and only time before or since (to my knowledge),
omitted China, North Korea, and Albani.a (but not North Vietnam);
and, second, the November 1963 issue of Problemy mira i sotsialisma
(passed for the press, October 19, 1964)T WIorld Marxist Review,
VI, 11), which contained the article by Romanian Premier Maurer
opposing the conference, also reproduced excerpts from declara-
tions by various parties calling for such a conference. Duevel
deduces from this that the Soviets were unable to gain a majority
in the editorial board. of the journal to exclude the Maurer
article, a fact which contributed toward., and indeed may have
been primarily responsible for. Khrushchev's abandonment of the
meeting; I would rather think it probably reflected some inter-
mediate stage in Khrushchev's retreat from ito For the October
26 Chou Yangspeech, see infra, p and. footnote 5
Ii
Two developments highlighted Sino-Soviet relations in the
past year and a half and combined to bring them to a new crisis
by June 1965. The first was the accelerated decline of Soviet
influence in the Communist world., climaxed by the failure of the
second Soviet attempt to mobilize its allies for collective ac-
tion against China. The second was the American military esca-
lation into North Vietnam and the Soviet decision not to risk a
major military confrontation with the United States when its own
vital national interests were not directly involved and the
prime profiteem from such a confrontation would be not Moscow
but its enemies or unreliable friends in Peking or Hanoi.
The Soviet Conference Plan Renewed
1. Calm Before the Storm (December 1963-April 1964)
The Soviets probably never abandoned their conference plans;
they only executed. a temporary tactical retreat to regroup their
forces. In public they refrained from anti-Chinese polemics,
urged Peking to do the same, and reiterated their demonstrated
desire to improve relations with China. In private they began
a new conciliatory exchange of letters with the Chinese. Expect-
ing to succeed in neither, they hoped that their apparent modera-
tion would help dispel the fears of their reluctant allies, that
Moscow would try to reimpose Soviet control over them once a split
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with Peking had occurred Taking, therefore, a very pragmatic
position concerning the style of Sino-Soviet negotiations, they
proposed that both sides should agree on as many issues as they
could and should postpone the consideration of undecided ques-
tions. In particular, they should cooperate against imperialism,
i.e., not go beyond Moscow's vital national interests in so doing.
Consequently they offered a resumption of economic and techni-
cal (but not of military) assistance to China. Finally, they
were silent on the vexed Albanian and. Yugoslav issues.
All the elements in this Soviet position have one factor
in common: they were calculated to appeal to Moscow's reluctant
allies (Romanians, Cubans, Italians, and others) who all wanted
the end of polemics, the deferment of unagreed issues, the end
of Soviet use of economic and technical assistance as a means
of pressure (but no atomic aid to a militant China which might
stumble into a nuclear war), and a more pragmatic Soviet position
on the Yugoslav and Albanian issues. From these parties' point
of view the Chinese could legitimately be expected to accept all
these points, or at least to keep quiet about those they did not.
Conversely, the Soviets had nothing to lose by making these pro-
posals, since (a) they could feel quite sure that Peking would
not accept them and (b) the subsequent Chinese refusal would
help Moscow gain allies for relaunching of the conference project.
The Chinese, on the other hand, continued to play a double
game. They had helped foil the first Soviet attempt at a con-
ference in part by deliberately creating a credible deterrent
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against it--ie., they had convinced the reluctant Soviet allies
that they were prepared to be so adamantly opposed to compromise
with Moscow that the Soviets would feel compelled to plunge into
a split. Moreover, they did this while maintaining a public
position against a split and in favor of (prolonged) negotiation,
i.e., delay.
The Chinese were most likely to gain supporters among reluc-
tant Soviet allies on the organizational issue (independence from
Moscow) and the least likely so, except for Castro, on such policy
issues as priority for revolutionary struggle in underdeveloped
areas, high risk-taking vis- -vis Washington, and anti-de-Stalin-
ization. Peking therefore stressed the organizational and
procedural issues and tried to center its secret exchanges with
the Soviets on attacking the Soviet intention to compel them to
surrender or to force a split, while declaring that the CCP
preferred delay and was opposed to a split (like the reluctant
Soviet allies). Meanwhile, their public pronouncements consider-
ably intensified their ideological extremism. In any case, the
Chinese did not want an international split but rather, like the
reluctant Soviet allies, preferred delay, so as to increase
Chinese opportunities for factionalism and splitting with
individual parties, while the Soviet allies wanted to avoid re-
newed Soviet pressure against their autonomy. The Soviets, the
Chinese could feel sure, would soon again feel compelled to call
a conference, thereby allowing them to abandon their private
conciliatory position while still putting the Soviets in the wrong
with their reluctant allies.
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The interim conciliatory Soviet line was first outlined in
a November 29 letter from the CPSU to the CCP Central Committee.
Addressed also to Mao personally and, signed by Khrushchev, it
was not made public by Peking until May 8. Since Moscow must
have assumed, correctly, that Peking would reject its overtures
(except perhaps for some minor increase in Sino-Soviet trade),
the letter's contents and the fact -that Moscow did not publish
it were primarily intended to appeal to the reluctant Soviet
allies. The letter contrasted strikingly with the September-
October 1963 Moscow conference plan and was reminiscent of, and
probably influenced by, the PCI position. True, it reaffirmed
Soviet support for an all-party conference, but this time for one
which "will lead not to a split . - - but to genuine unity and
solidarity. - . " Polemics should be ended, but not "exchanges
on view on questions of principleo" Sino-Soviet relations must
be improved to benefit not primarily either Moscow or Peking
but rather "the Communist movement," particularly those parties
which, "forced tc . . . struggle against imperialism in ex-
tremely difficult and complex circumstances - . c, rightly con-
sider they require friendship with both the CPSU and the CCP."
(The reference to such neutralist or only partially pro-Chinese
parties as Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea was clearo) The
pragmatic Soviet position was outlined clearly:
0 . I not to concentrate on . - differences
between us but let them wait . . . develop our
-13-
cooperation where favorable possibilities
exist 3. .
particularly for peace and against imperialism. Specifically,
the Soviet letter proposed (a) increase in Sino-Soviet trade, (b)
resumption of Soviet technical aid, and sending of specialists to
China, particularly in the oil and mining industries, (c) scien-
tific, technical, and, cultural Sino-Soviet cooperation, and (d)
discussions on delineation of the Sino-Soviet boundary, the
historical nature of which, it stated, should be taken for
granted. and accepted-
The Chinese ideological, and therefore political, position
had already hardened--albeit this was then known only within the
Chinese elite--in late October. On October 26, the day after
Khrushchev publicly retreated from his conference plan, Chou Yang,
Chinese agitprop deputy head, in a speech in Peking first pro-
vided the ideological imperative for Chinese factionalism. The
3. The parallel to the agreed formulation for the second
Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement is striking (see Griffith, The Sino-
Soviet Rift, pp. 47, 85-87),
4. "CPSU CC to CCP CC,0 November 28, 1963, quoted from Peking
Review,% 19 (May 8, 1964), pp. 18-21, at pp. 19, 21. For the
same geneiaLy conciliatory tone, but few of the November 29
letter's specific proposals, see "The Marxist-Leninist Program
of the Communist Movement," Kommunist, No. 17, November 1963, pp.
12-24 and "For the Unity and Solidarity of the International
Communist Movement," Pravda, December 6, 1963. Conversely, the
November 17-December 3 National Peoples Congress session in Peking
indicated the Chinese neither intended to renew Soviet economic
aid nor expected help. See Peking Review, VI, 49 (December 6,
1963), pp. 10-11, while Mao's January 12, 1964 statement on the
U.S.-Panamanian crisis indicated an adamant CPR foreign policy
stand (ibid., VII, 3 Fianuary 17, 1964_J, p. 5).
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speech reflected policy decisions by the Chinese leadership to
intensify their factional activities and bring them into the open
by the formal establishment of rival "Marxist-Leninist" Communist
parties, as well as to intensify intellectual repression domes-
tically. The keynote of the speech, although Leninist in spirit,
went far beyond anything that Lenin had ever explicitly proclaimed:
Everything tends to divide itself in two.
Theories are no exception, and they also tend to
divide. Wherever there is a revolutionary, scien-
tific doctrine, its antithesis, a counterrevolu-
tionary, antiscientific doctrine, is bound to
arise in the course of the development of that
doctrine, . . I
"Political parties genuinely representing the revolutionary
proletariat," i pro-Chinese., therefore "are bound to appear"
everywhere. Conversely, the CPSU leadership's revisionism was
leading it to forfeit "its place in the ranks of the vanguards
of the international proletariat," a role which, Chou implied,
would fall to China. Knowing that any increase of factionalism
would not appeal to the reluctant Soviet allies, Chou implicitly
but clearly defended the Romanian resistance to Soviet "neo-
colonialist theory." Finally, in order to strengthen its desired
international image as organizationally conciliatory and plura-
listic even if ideologically adamant, Peking did not publish the
Chou speech until December 27, by which time the Soviet resump-
tion of their conference plan was again becoming clear, thereby
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making it seem that they rather than the Chinese, were pushing
for an international split.
Fitting theory to practice, the Chinese expanded and brought
more into the open their factional activities0 The subsequent
weeks saw the official call for founding congresses of two new
"Marxist-Leninist" (ice., pro-Chinese) parties, in Belgium and
Ceylon, and a "declaration of Marxist-Leninists" foreshadowing
a third such party in Australia, In all three cases the Communist
party concerned had formerly been pro-Soviet, and Chinese activi-
ty and Chinese financing had played a significant role in the
split and the formation of the new pro-Chinese groups.
5. Chou Yang, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in
Philosophy and the Social Sciences," Jen-min Jih-pao, December
27, 1963, quoted from Peking Review, VII, 1 (January 3, 1964),
pp. .l0-27, at pp. 12, 15, 21-22. The first Chinese announcement
concerning the Fourth Expanded Conference of the Department of
Philosophy and Social Science of the Chinese Academy of Science,
at which Chou Yang delivered the speech, mentioned his partici-
pation and gave the title but not the contents of his speech.
See ibid., VI, 49 (December 6, 1963), pp. 26-28.
6. "Declaration of Australian Marxist-Leninists," (Novem-
ber 11, 1963), ibid , p 20-25; "To all Marxist-Leninists Inside
the Ceylon Communist Party," (November 17, 1963), ibid., VI, 50
(December 13, 1963), PP- 15-17; "Belgian Marxist-Leninists Decide
to Rebuild Communist Party," (declaration of Brussels conference,
December 22, 1963), ibid., VII, 3 (January 17, 1964), pp. 26-27.
For the 1963 CPR support of the dissident Brazilian CP, see
Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p, 128; for simultaneous-ideologi-
cal and political escalation (in Soviet-Albainian relations), see
Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 6o-88,
Moreover Chou En-lai's December 1963-January 1964 visit to
Africa and Albania signaled not only Peking's continued support
7
of Albania's intransigence but also an increase in Chinese
political, economi c, and subversive activities in the Black
8
Continent.
That Sino-Soviet conflict within international Communist
front organizations remained at a high level became clear at the
November 28-December 3, 1963 Warsaw meeting of the World Council
of Peace, where a dissenting Chinese resolution was voted down
by a pro-Soviet majority. Furthermore at the Djakarta prepara-
tory meeting for the Second Afro-Asi.an Conference Peking succeeded
in vetoing the inclusion of the Soviets as full members,10 as the
Soviets had earlier been excluded from a Djakarta Afro-Asian
trade union meeting,
7 Peking Review, V1I, 3 (January 17, 196), pp. 11-22.
8. William E. Griffith, "Africa,," in Survey, no- 54., January
1965, reprinted in Leopold Labedz, ed., International Communism
After Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.- The MQlQT. Press, 1965), pp.
168-189, at p, 187.
9. November 28 speech by Liao Cheng-chih, Peking Review,
VI, 49 (December 6, 1963), pp 12-15; "Two Different Lines at the
Warsaw Session, ibid., V, 50 (December 13, 1963), pp. 13-15;
Pravda, November 29-December 4, 1963 (excerpts: Current Digest of
the Soviet Press [hereafter CDSPh 48 &ecember 25, 1963, pp. 2 9
31; and, re the protest against Tiomage to the late President
Kennedy by the Chinese and their allies, Reuter from Warsaw in
The New York Times, November 29, 1963.
10. Trud, December 24, 1964; Khrushchev in Pravda, December
22, 1964.
1lc Djakarta correspondent Is dispatch in English to NCNA
Peking, June 29, 1964, 1418 GMT
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Nor were the Soviets inactive on the factional front. In
view of subsequent events one may assume that Moscow was already
in active contact with Yoshio Shiga, who some months later, with
Soviet support, began efforts to set up an anti-Chinese group
(and eventually Communist party) in Japan.l2
The only significant Soviet success in this phase was the
marked improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations signaled by the
January 1964 Soviet-Cuban communique. In it Fidel Castro, pre-
sumably in return for more Soviet economic aid, endorsed the
Soviet position that peaceful coexistence was the "general line"
and the 1957 and 1960 "condemnation of factional and sectional
activity . . in the international Communist movement" and
0 0 expressed his approval of the measures under-
taken by the CPSU Central Committee for the liquida-
tion of existing differences in and the strengthening
of unity and cohesion of the ranks of the interna-
tional Communist movement. . . .13
Even so, Cuban silence on Sino-Soviet relations continued there-
after, thus indicating that Castro's lack of enthusiasm for a
Sino-Soviet split remained.
Moscow also increasingly met Chinese challenge in underde-
veloped areas, the more so because of the opportunities offered
the Soviets by the increasingly radical and anti-Western policies
of many of these states. In a forerunner of Khrushchev's mid-
1964 expedition to Cairo and stepped-up courtship of Algeria,
12. See p. 39 , infra.
13. Pravda, January 23, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 4
(February 19, 1964), pp. 26-27, at p. 27.
18
Pravda in early December 1963 authoritatively, albeit not explicitly,
modified the November 1960 Declaration's concept of "national democ-
racy" (of which legalization of Communist parties, something which
Ben Bella and Nasser were unwilling to permit, had been one of the
preconditions) by substituting for it the new concept of "revolu-
tionary democracy," or., more generally, of "non-capitalist develop-
ment.t The latter, Pravda declared, may occur without the existence
of a Communist party
0 0 o in countries where the proletariat has not
yet taken shape as a class or where it has not
yet become a sufficiently powerful force .
but then only by the influence of the world
socialist system . . .
i.e. the Soviet Union takes the place of the local Communist party,
and cooperation with the Soviet Union guarantees socialist develop-
ment.14
Later in the month Khrushchev made this even more explicit,
While Marxist-Leninists would prefer a "national democratic state"
(i.e. toleration of a legal Communist party), he declared,
Of course this does not preclude other forms
of development along the path of national libera-
tion and social progress 0
14"For the Unity and Solidarity of the International Communist
Movement," Pravda, December 6, 1963, quoted from CDSP, XV, 7(December 18,1963), pp., 15-19, at p. 17. For Khrushchev in the UAR,
see ibid., May 17, 21, 25, 27, 196L. Cf. C. Duevel, "Moscow on the
Defensive," Radio Liberty/Munich, December 11, 1963I
19
He prescribed only one condition:
Socialism cannot be built on positions of anti-
ccnmunism, opposing the countries in which socialism 15
has won the victory and persecuting the Communists . . .
i.e. to "build socialism" (and get Soviet support) a radical na-
tionalist regime must ally itself with the Soviet Union and, although
it may ban the existence of a Communist party, it must not imprison
or persecute individual Communists, but rather allow them to parti-
cipate in the ruling elite.
Finally, pro-Soviet publications made clear as early as Janu-
ary if not explicit, that Moscow would not remain inactive in the
face of Chinese factional activityol 6
Khrushchev's early January 1964 proposal for renunciation of
force in territorial disputes was probably also primarily aimed at
countering Peking's claims to Soviet territory. 1 7
"Replies of N. S. Khrushchev to questions of Editors of
Ghanian Times, Alger Republicain, Le Peuple and Botataung," Pravda
and Izvestiya, December 22, 1963, quoted from CDSP, XV, 51 (January
15, 1964), pp. 11-16, at p0 13; cf0 the penetrating analysis by Uri
Ralanan, "Moscow and the "Third World," Problems of Communism, XIV,
1 (January-February 1965), pp. 22-31, which also outlines similar
but less explicit early 1963 developments.
16 One of the earliest indications was Vhclav Slavik, Norman
Freed, and Mourad Kouwatli, "Unity Is the Guarantee of Success,"
World Marxist Review, VII, 1 (January 1964), pp. 3-8. See also the
attack on "neutrality" in Jaime Perez, "The CPSU in the Vanguard
of the World Communist Movement," ibid., pp. 9-15.
17 Khrushchev in Pravda, January 4, 1964; see also "Why
Mislead?t, ibid., January 30, 1964.
20
In mid-December the Chinese published their sixth "Comment"
on the July 14 Soviet "Open Letter," this time on peaceful coex-
istence. This article did not throw any substantially new light
on the Chinese position, which remained one of advocating higher
risk-taking in national liberation struggles. Like Peking's
November 19 fifth Ocomment,"1 8 it was so phrased as to counteract
the Soviet denunciation of the Chinese as warmongers opposed to
peaceful coexistence, while at the same time it appealed to all
strongly anti-American Communist parties by stressing Khrushchev's
19priority for a Soviet-American agreement. The article was pri-
marily significant for its reaffirmation, for the first time after
the (then still not publicly known) November 29 Soviet letter, of
the adamancy of the Chinese position. It made no reference to the
organizational and procedural issues. The Albanians continued
their vitriolic denunciations of Khrushchev, which the Chinese
regularly reprinted , 20
18 Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift,, pp 227-2294
19 "Peaceful Coexistence-,Two Diametrically Opposed Policies.
Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, VI,"
Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Chvi, December 12, 1963, and Peking Review,
VI, 51 (December 20, 17763'p 0 6-18I
20 Eog, "The Moscow Declaration--Invincible Banner of the
Struggle Against Imperialism and Revisionism," Zri i Popullit,
December 6, 1963, reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, tecember 253 1963
(SCMP 3129, December 31, 1963.)
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That the Chinese position was becoming increasingly and
explicitly more adamant became even more clear with the publica-
tion on February ., 196 of Peking's seventh "Comment," entitled
"The Leaders of the C. P. S. U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our
Times."21 This article made explicit what the Chou Yang speech
had implied: the Chinese now publicly and explicitly demanded
nothing less than the complete reversal of Soviet domestic and
foreign policy since Stalinvs death, plus Moscow's abandonment of
its allies and acquiescence in Peking's subversion of them. After
reiterating the Chou Yang fonnulation that splits always occur in
communist parties and that true Marxist-Leninists must struggle
against revisionists even if the latter are in a "temporary" ma-
jority, the article declared that
. 0 . the leaders of the CPSU headed by Khrushchev
have become the chief representatives of modern
revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in
the international Communist movement .
As evidence the article referred to, without explicitly identifying,
Soviet policy toward Romania; it expanded explicitly and at length
on Soviet coercion of Albania; it for the first time explicitly ac-
cused Khrushchev of conspiring with Marshal Pveng Teh-huai in 1959;
21 Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, February 4, 1964, quoted from
Peking Review, VII, 6 (February 6, 196h), pp. 5-21, at pp. 9, 11, 1.
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and, finally9 it ascribed the origin of Khrushchevvs revisionism
to "the lush growth of the bourgeois elements inside the Soviet
Union.," a theme which the Chinese would soon extensively elaborate,
and to imperialist policy. The CCP was not anti-Soviet, the arti-
cle continued, but Khrushchev was; by attacking him the CCP repre-
sented the true interests of the Soviet people. With respect to
the headship of, or vanguard position inithe international Com-
munist movement the article declared that no headship is now pos-
sible since all parties are "independent and completely equal,"
but that in any case the CPSU has by its "revisionism and split-
tism , . . automatically forfeited the position of 'head." Thus
the CCP explicitly and unilaterally revised the 1960 Declaration,
which had termed the CPSU the avanguardo1 ' With respect to the
Soviet position that the majority of all parties could bind all
of them the article not only again explicitly rejected it but
declared that the Soviet majority was "false." With respect to
the CCP's support of "Marxist-Leninist" (ie. pro-Chinese) parties,
the article reaffinned that this would continue and specifically
endorsed the Belgian, Brazilian, Italian, Australian, U. S., and
Indian pro-Chinese groupso Finally, the article reiterated the
Chinese position against the end of public polemics, gave the
Soviets another detailed list of demands for their capitulation,
and reaffirmed Chinese finmness and refusal to compromise.
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Whether or not the Chinese knew when they published their
February L article that Moscow was preparing a similar attack re-
mains unclear. In any case the Chinese vow to resist to the end
Soviet attempts to split the international movement was calculated
to appeal to the parties who opposed a split, and who were not im-
mediately menaced by Peking's announcement of intensified Chinese
factional activities.
On February 12 the Soviets sent a letter to all but the pro-
Chinese parties; although never published, its contents can be
inferred from subsequent Austrian, Romanian, Soviet, and Chinese
22
Communist sources, Moscow declared that Peking had not yet
replied to the Soviet November 29, 1963 letter, but rather was
intensifying both polemics and factional activities. Therefore
the forthcoming Soviet Central Committee plenum would discuss
fully the situation, decide upon the required measures, and pub-
lish its proceedings. Moreover the letter stressed that it was
necessary to "give a rebuff" to the Chinese and take "collective
22 The most complete summary is in the report of Franz Muhri
to the Austrian CP CC Plenum of May 6, 196L, Volksstimme (Vienna),
May 13, 196L (JPRS 25,084, June 15, 1964, pp 11-21, at pp. 1-15).
A briefer Soviet summary is in the February 22, 1964 CPSU CC letter,
cited in ftn. 29, infra; and still briefer references are in the
Romanian CC statement published on April 27, cited in ftn. 62, infra,
and the February 20 CCP CC letter, cited in ftn. 27, infra. Whether
the CPSU CC actually approved this letter is not clear; the only
published reference to it discussing Sino-Soviet relations is on
February 15, when it approved the resolution discussed below.
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measures to strengthen the unity" of the international Communist
movement. This should be done through an international conference,
the further postponement of which was being utilized by Peking only
for its splitting activities.I
The subsequent violent Suslov report of February 14 to the
Soviet Central Committee was primarily an organizational move.
Suslov declared that the CCP leaders "have created the direct threat
of a split," in that they
. 0 0 have . . . countered the general line of the
international Communist movement with their own
special line, which revises from positions of
great-power chauvinism and petty-bourgeois adven-
turism the 1957 and 1960 Declarations . . . .
Moreover by their "schismatic activity" the Chinese leadership aims
0 0 0 . toward forming under its aegis something in
the nature of a special international bloc and
counterposing it to the international Communist
movement as a weapon for intensifying the struggle
against it . o .
(his probably was an eventual Chinese goal, but a more distant
one than the Soviet one of organizing their own bloc against Peking,)
Therefore, Suslov continued,
0 0 . The policy and activities of the Chinese
leaders today constitute the chief danger to the
unity of the international Communist movement . 0 0 0
Suslov rehashed at length the Soviet viewpoint on the past
course of the dispute; but unfortunately he revealed little or no
significant new facts concerning it. He declared (truthfully)
that the Chinese had by their actions rejected the Soviet proposals
of November 29, 1963. He denounced the Chinese theory of an inter-
mediate zone (a rapprochement with Japan and Western Europe directed
against Moscow and Washington) and their attitude on the Yugoslav
and Albanian questions. He attacked Mao's personality cult as
comparable to Stalins, and simultaneously denounced "the anti-
Party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov . . . who have
been expelled from . . . our party"--the first public announcenent
of their expulsion and an implied threat to the Chinese position
within the international Communist movement. He declared that the
"filthy scheme" of the Chinese "to isolate Comrade Khrushchev from
the Central Committee . . . is doomed to complete and shameful
failure." In sumcondemning the totality of the Chinese positions,
Suslov declared that Moscow would resume polemics against the "neo-
Trotskyite" Chinese positions, that the struggle with them would be
"serious and . . . prolonged," and that there must be held an inter-
national conference so as to make possible
0 0 0 collective efforts . . . to determine the
necessary ways and means for preserving and
strengthening the Marxist-Leninist unity of the
Communist ranks 0 .
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Suslov said nothing about excommunication, but also nothing
about omitting anything which would endanger unity; rather, parti-
cularly by declaring that the CCP was now the "main danger,," he
clearly implied that the 1960 Declaration should be revised ac-
cordingly and (somewhat less explicitly) that organizational ma-
chinery for 1strengthening unity" might be necessary.2 3
The Suslov report and the resultant Soviet Central Committee
resolution were not published for nearly two months, on April 3.
Why? Two explanations suggest themselves. First, there was re-
sistance to them within the Soviet leadership that resulted in a
compromise providing for postponement of publication. Second, the
balance for postponement was tipped by the Romanian mediation attempt.
As to the first possibility, some reports to this effect circulated
in Moscow after Khrushchev2s fall.2 , That the Suslov report included
1 1
23 Pravda, April 3,, 196L quoted (with a minor revision) from
CDSP, XVI, 13 (April 22, 1964), pp0 5-16, at p. 5, and XV, L
(April 29, 1964), pp. 3-17, at pp- 8, 14-17. The late Otto Kuusinen
declared at the same plenum that in China there was "no dictatorship
of the proletariat and no leading role of the Communist Party";
rather, there is a dictatorship of the individual. /i.e. Mao7
(Pravda, May 19, 196, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 20 /Junie 10, 1967,
PP 3-4, 10, at po L /fravdavs italics7)
24 The plenum was very Uexpanded"; it was also attended by
hundreds of other party and governmental officials (Pravda, February
11, 1964.) Furthermore, the Suslov report was given in the larger
Congress Palace rather than in the Supreme Soviet meeting place,
where the plenum first met, (Tatu from Moscow in Le Monde, February
18, 1964), and Moscow later declared that "6,000 activists" were pres-
ent (CPSU CC to CCP CC, March 7, 1964, cited in ftn0 33, infra.) In
view of Khrushchev's October 2, 196b expanded presidium session, in-
cluding some thousands (Pravda, October 2, 196), one may perhaps
speculate that Suslov also spoke to such large audiences that the CC
may have felt itself to have been packed.
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the first public announcement of the expulsion from the CPSU of
Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov (a move which had probably been
in dispute among the Soviet leadership at the Twenty-Second CPSU
Congress) strengthens the credibility of such reports, indicating
renewed dissension on this and other issues. As to the second,
Bucharest has declared25 (and Moscow has not denied) that the
Romanian protest came on February li, the day of Suslovts report,
and that the Soviet reply agreeing to postponement reached Bucharest
the same day.
On the following day, February 15, the Soviet Central Commit-
tee adopted a resolution whose equivocal contents implicitly re-
flected the decision to postpone publication. Although it, like
Suslov's report, was violent in tone and declared that "ideological
exposuret (i.e. resumption of polemics) and "a decisive rebuff to
Chinese schismatic activities" were required, it did not mention an
international conference, it did not officially "approve" Suslov's
report but only theard and discussed" it, and it statedwhich Suslov
did not, that the plenum "expresses its readiness to exert further
efforts toward nomalizing the relations between the CPSU and the
CCP 0 0 0 0"26
25 See footnote 62, infra.
26 "On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Solidarity of the
International Communist Movement," Resolution of Plenum of CPSU CC,
adopted February 15, 196b, Pravda, April 3, 1964, quoted from CDSP,
XVI, 13 (April 22, 196), pkTl.
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Simultaneously with their appeal to the Soviets the Romanians
also appealed to the Chinese to end polemics and proposed a Sino-
Romanian bilateral meeting, On February 17 Mao replied agreeing
to such a meeting and adding that, if it took place soon, Peking
would "1temporarily0 suspend polemics.
But Maovs apparent reasonableness was deceptive, as became
apparent to Communist elites when they received copies of the (then
unpublished) February 20 Chinese letter to Moscow. The optimal
Chinese strategy, since predictably a renewed Soviet move toward
an international conference was unavoidable and since the Chinese
wanted neither split nor reconciliation, was to delay such a con-
ference and thereby ensure its failure, From Pekingvs viewpoint
it probably appeared strategic, with respect to the reaction of
other Communist parties, flatly to reject the ostensibly conciliatory
Soviet November 29, 1963 letter0  The Chinese therefore waited until
the Soviets resumed their drive for a conference, thereby permitting
them to accuse Moscow of once more desiring a tschismatict conference
while professing conciliation.
The Romanian move, which Peking made possible by its substan-
tive adamancy, must have seemed to the Chinese an excellent contribu-
tion to their preferred strategy. Tactically, Peking was quick to
seize upon the fact that the Soviets had circulated a "factional',
letter against them without sending them a copy,2 7  (In all likelihood
27 CCP CC to CPSU CC, February 20, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9,
1964 and Peking Review, VII, 19 (May 8, 1964), ppo 10-11.
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"it was no accident that" on the same day, February 20, the Albanians
seized the Soviet embassy buildings in Tirana.)2 8
The Soviets immediately and violently replied that they had
not sent a copy to Peking because the Chinese had consistently re-
fused to reply to their conciliatory demarches but had on the con-
trary continued to attack them and intensified their "schismatic
factional activity."2 9 The Chinese thereupon challenged the Soviets
to carry out their "empty threats," to tell them exactly what they
proposed to do, to publish the Chinese views, and to send Peking
the February 12 letter. 3 0
The Chinese sent the Soviets their (only later published)
reply to the lattervs November 29, 1963 article on February 29,
196L, the day before the Romanian delegationvs arrival in Peking.
Its contents made Chinese strategy clear. Substantively, the Chi-
nese remained adamant and arrogant: as in their previous published
articles and unpublished letters, they summarized uncompromisingly
the issues in the dispute and dared the Soviets to do their worst.
With respect both to specific Soviet proposals for renewed contacts
and to the organizational issue of the international conference,
they took a seemingly conciliatory attitude. Although they denounced
28 Izvestiya, February 25, 1964.
29 CPSU CC to CCP CC, February 22, 1964, Peking Review, VII,
19 (May 8, 1964), pp. 22-2L.
30 CCP CC to CPSU CC, February 27, 1964, ibid., VII, 19
(May 8, 1964), pp0 11-120
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the Soviets for alleged subversive activities in Sinkiang, they
agreed to accept the "historic" Sino-Soviet border as a basis for
Sino-Soviet border negotiations. (These negotiations in fact had
begun in Peking on February 25; we know nothing of their course or
outcome, but presumably they were broken off without results.)
The Chinese letter's position on Sino-Soviet economic relations
was mixed, they rejected the return of Soviet experts on the
ground that Moscow could not be trusted not to use them again as a
political weapon; they denounced the Soviets for having made them
pay for the Soviet arms sent to China during the Korean War; and
with respect to trade they declared that they had proposed, and
Moscow had prevented, an increase in Sino-Soviet economic exchanges.
They added two points sure to appeal to the Romanians: Moscow
should cease trying to perpetuate lack of economic and industrial
development in some socialist countries, and all socialist countries
should be able to join a genuinely international CMEAO As to public
polemics, the Chinese (correctly) pointed out that the Soviets had
started them and at first refused to agree to their halt, but now
had reversed their position since the polemics were not to Moscow's
advantage; that the Soviets continued to carry on some direct
polemics31 as did other Communist parties (significantly, Poland
and Romania were omitted from the latter list-a clear indication
31 Jen-min Jih-pao, March 1, 196L and Peking Review, VII, 10
(March 6, 1964), pp. 27-290
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of where Peking thought it might get support); and suspension of
polemics could only follow bilateral and multilateral consultations.
Peking endorsed an international conference with "adequate prepara-
tions." For this purpose the Chinese proposed that bilateral Sino-
Soviet talks should be resumed in Peking from October 10 to 25, 1964,
to be followed by a preparatory meeting of seventeen parties, those
in power (excluding Yugoslavia) plus Indonesia, Japan, Italy, and
France 32
The specific Chinese proposal for resumption of negotiations
looked reasonable on the face of it. Bilateral Sino-Soviet discus-
sions would be resumed in the autumn (i.e. within several months.)
They would be in Peking because the last such meeting had been in
Moscow. The size and composition--17 instead of 26 member prepara-
tory committee (as in 1960)--could be justified as including two
pro-Soviet and two pro-Chinese nonruling parties while eliminating
inter alia those parties (Brazil, India, Great Britain, the United
States, and Australia) in which pro-Chinese groups had already been
constituted and either had been or probably would be constituted
as parties, thereby preventing endless dispute over the committee's
membership. Yet closer study makes clear that the Chinese had
stacked the procedure and participants in their favor. No specific
32 CCP CC to CPSU CC, February 29, 196L, Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9,
1964 and Peking Review, VII, 19 (May 8, 1964), pp. 12-1,
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date was set for the preparatory committee meeting, and it presumably
could not meet until Sino-Soviet discussions had been successfulj
i.e. unless China2 s terms were accepted by Moscow-in other words,
never, If one adds to the six clearly pro-Chinese parties (Albania,
China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan) the four others either
opposed to an international conference or at least to excommunication
of the Chinese (Cuba, Italy, Poland, and Romania), the Chinese po-
tentially had the support of ten out of the seventeen. Even if
Poland finally voted with the Soviets, as it probably would, the
result would be nine to eight in the interests of Peking. So far
had Soviet control slipped.
The March Sino-Romanian discussions in Peking came to nothing.
The Chinese would not even agree to suspend polemics during bilateral
discussions about their suspension. While the discussions were
taking place, the Soviet Central Committee on March 7 answered the
Chinese letters of February 27 and 29. The Soviet letter condemned
the Chinese ideological deviations and factional activity as strongly
as before. It dismissed the Chinese demand that the Soviets publish
Peking's articles as a proposal actually for intensifying polemicsI
It declared that the Soviets continued to refrain from polemics and
that the Chinese should do likewise and cease their factional activity.
It reiterated that the general line for the international Communist
movement could "only collectively" be worked out, while stressing
that Moscow anticipated and would work toward renewed international
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Communist unity. It (correctly) termed the Chinese February 29
letter a total rejection of the Soviet November 29, 1963 proposals.
Finally, it welcomed the Chinese endorsement of a conference; how-
ever, it declared (hypocritically) that the delay proposed by the
Chinese was "inexplicable," and added that "we also fail to under-
stand" why the Chinese proposed only 17 members of the preparatory
committee. It proposed instead that bilateral Sino-Soviet discus-
sions resume in Peking in May 1964, that the preparatory committee,
composed of the same 26 parties as in 1960, meet in June-July 1964,
and that the all-party meeting, "with the agreement of the fraternal
parties," convene in autumn 1964 3 3
After inconclusive discussions in Peking and thereafter in
Pyongyang the Romanian delegation stopped in Moscow. There the
Soviets at first insisted they must publish the February plenum
material, but then agreed that if the Romanians could persuade the
Chinese to cease polemics, the Soviets would continue to do like-
wise. The Romanians thereupon drafted an "Appeal," to be addressed
to all parties by Moscow, Peking, and Bucharest, which they sent to
the Soviets and Chinese on March 25. Moscow accepted it Uin general";
Peking apparently did not reply; but on March 31 the Chinese pub-
lished the eight "Comment" on the Soviet Open Letter of July 1963,
CPSU CC to CCP CC, March 7, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9,
1964 and Peking Review, VII, 19 (May 8, 196), pp. 24-27.
which in turn precipitated Soviet publication of the February plenum
material on April 3.
The eighth "Comment" added little of substance to Peking's
position. Its primary significance was in its total rejection of
all Soviet approaches, thereby symbolizing the end of the post-
November 1963 public detente and the resumption of open polemics
by both sides. It was written "in more explicit terms than before,"
i.e. more clearly directed against Khrushchev personally, and more
explicit in demanding his removal. It reiterated, without further
developing, the Chinese thesis that the social basis of Khrushchev s
revisionism was "the capitalist forces that are ceaselessly spread-
ing in the Soviet Union." It stressed violent revolution and de-
clared that the Soviet line of peaceful transition had betrayed
the revolutions in Cuba, Algeria, and Iraq. Finally, by describing
Khrushchev as the revisionist successor of Browder as well as of
Tito, it underlined the evils of the Soviet policy of rapprochement
with Washington.35
I
34 For the above, see the Romanian April 27 resolution,
cited in ftn, 62, infra0
"The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism-
Comment on the Open Letter of the CPSU (VIII),"# Jen-min Jih-pao and
Hung Chli, March 31, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, VII, 14
(April 3, 1964), pp. 5-23
III
Khrushchev's Second Conference Attempt
April-October 1964
The April 1964 publication of the February Suslov report and
the Soviet Central Committee resolution36 signaled the beginning of
a new phase: the second and a much more explicit, all-out Soviet
attempt to mobilize other Communist parties against the Chinese.
Four aspects of this phase may be distinguished: (1) the maximum
Soviet position, (2) the Chinese opposition to it, (3) the resist-
ance of other Communist parties opposed to Moscow2 s aims, and (4)
the resultant Soviet retreat with respect to the purposes and tactics
of the proposed international conference,
The Maximum Soviet Position
Once the Suslov report was published, a wave of anti-Chinese
agitation swept Soviet supporters in the international Communist
36 The accompanying April 3, 196L Pravda editorial, "Fidelity
to the Principles of Marxism=Leninism,," was only notable because it
omitted any mention of an international conference, concerning which,
however, Suslov's fonulations were repeated in the long "For the
Unity of the International Communist Movement on Principles of Marxism-
Leninism," Kommunist, No, 5, March 196)4, (passed for the press, April 4,
1964), pp 13-52 (JPRS 24, 404, April 30, 1964.) For Chinese reaction,
see Peking Review, VII, 18 (May 1, 1964), pp. 13-19. In March the CPSU
Institute of Marxism-Leninism had (opportunely, to say the least) dis-
covered Marx's and Engels' previously undiscovered 1872 amendments to
the First Internationals rules, which provided for the suspension of
national federations by the general council. Text: World Marxist
Review, VII, 4 (April 1964), pp. 30 -36.
36
movement.3 7  On May 15 Suslov declared that an international con-
ference was "necessary." 8  (In his February 14 report he had said
only that the CPSU "advocates" such a conference.) At the end of
April Moscow announced that "more than 70" parties favored such a
conference.39 On June 9 Pravda published an article by the head of
the Paraguayan party calling for an ?tearly" conference and declar-
ing that delay would mean intensified Chinese factional activity
and that indefinite postponement was "impossibleotth"
Moscow concentrated its attack on the nationalistic and anti-
Soviet Chinese formulations, particularly Mao vs "intermediate zone"
theory, the Chinese insistence that the basis of the world revolu-
tionary struggle was the peasantry rather than the proletariat,
Peking's demand to Itreexamine and correct" the 1957 and 1960
Declarations, and the growing cult of Mao's personality. Moreover
the Soviets insisted (incorrectly) that the November 1960 conference
had made majority decisions binding on all parties0 They simultan-
eously attacked Chinese internal policies, denouncing the CCP's
See ibid., VII, 5 (May 1964), pp. )4-90
38 Pravda, May 16, 1964,
See the Kommunist article cited in footnote 41, infra.
40 Pravda, June 9, 1964. For the above, see also r. r0 g./R. Rockingham Gill7, "A Conference Becanes Necessary," and "Problems
of the Conference,W RFE/Munich, May 19 and June 10, 1964, respectively.
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violation of its own statutes and its lack of party programoi
By far the most important aspect of the maximum Soviet posi-
tion was expressed in a brief passage of an April 3 speech by
Khrushchev in Budapest:
0 0 , The objective requirements of our
economic development, as well as the necessity
for struggling against all kinds of efforts to
weaken the solidarity of the socialist coun-
tries, demand persistent work on the improve-
ment of the entire system of our mutual rela-
tions. Apparently it would be expedient to
think jointly about those organizational forms
that would make it possible to improve the
constant exchange of opinions and the coordina-
tion of foreign poli cy between the member-
countries of the Council for Mutual Economic
Aid, the participants in the Warsaw Pact
In other words, some kind of fornal political coordinating organ
should be established, in which Moscow would inevitably swing the
most weight.
The Chinese Response: Peking s Foreign Policy Made Explicit
There is, surprisingly, no documentary evidence that the Chi-
nese exploited the ominous implications of this Khrushchev declara-
tion for those parties wishing to consolidate and extend their
"Proletarian Inten ationalism Is the Banner of the Working
People of All Countries and Continents," Kommunist, No. 7, May 1964
(signed to the press, April 29, 1964); "On Certain Aspects of Party
Life in the Communist Party of China," Pravda, April 28 and 29, 1964;
"Marxism-Leninism Is the International Doctrine of the Communists of
All Countries," ibido, May 10, 11, and 12, 1964.
L2 Pravda, April 4, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 15 (May 6,
196), pp 7-7, at Po 70
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increased autonomy from Moscow, Nevertheless the Chinese
adamantly refused to attend an international conference, the calling
of which, they declared, would cement a split. Conversely, they also
reiterated that they did not desire a split. In sum, on the issue
of postponing the conference or of emptying it of any real content,
Peking's position was partially aligned with that of the reluctant
pro-Soviet parties. A Chinese May 7 reply to the March 7 CPSU
letter was the clearest statement until that time of Peking s pref-
erence for indefinite delay of a conference, i.e. of the continua-
tion of a united international Communist movement in theory but of
its paralysis in practice. It declared that the termination of the
resumed Soviet polemics must be awaited before resuming bilateral
Sino-Soviet discussions, for which Peking now suggested May 1965
instead of October 196&, and it added that either Moscow or Peking
could request still further postponement, thereby implying itwould be
still further postponed. As to the all-party meeting, preparations
for it "may require four or five years, or even longer," ie. as
far as Peking was concerned it was postponed ad kalendas Graecas.
Finally, the Chinese immediately published this letter and all the
previously unpublished correspondence dating from November 29, 1963,
thus in effect ending any possibility of serious Sino-Soviet nego-
tiations.43
Jen-min Jih-pao, May 7, 1963 and Peking Review, VII, 19
(May 8, 1964 pp P 710
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Thereafter Chinese polemics against Moscow continued unabated.
They were only, as usual, exceeded in venom by those of the Albanians.
At the end of May Hoxha declared that Khrushchev and his associates
were criminals who had conspired to kill Stalin, and that itterror,
murder,, imprisonment, and concentration camps prevail in the Soviet
Union 0 4 4
Peking presumably inspired a New Zealand CP proposal for a
pro-Chinese international communist meeting,45 but when no other
parties endorsed it, -the Chinese let it drop,
Moscow., not to be left behind, accused Peking of financing
its factional activities by a world-wide narcotics traffic4 6
The unconditionally pro -Chinese parties continued to support
Peking completely," of the conditionally pro-Chinese ones, Hanoi
Zeri i Popullit, May 27, 196L (in a speech delivered May 24),
L5 NZCP National Committee resolution,, "On the World Ideological
Differences and a Meeting of the World Parties.," July 26, 1964, in
New Zealand Communist Review, August 1964, quoted from full text in
Peking Review' VI. 35 (Agust 28, 1964), pp. 26-27.
Ovchinnikov from Tokyo in Pravda, September 13, 196L,; "Has
the Pravda Editorial Department No iene of Shame?", Jen-min Jih-pao,
September 21, 1964 and Peking Review, VII, 39 (Septemer25 ,19),
ppo 13-14.
E4g7, the New Zealand CP April 8, 1964 declaration and the
pro-Chinese Belgium CP leader Jacques Grippavs editorial, in Peking
Review, VII, 19 (May 8, 1961), ppo 35-36. In the case of the Japanese
CP, Peking profited from Moscow's continued support of the pro-Soviet
Shiga splinter group. When on May 15, 1964 JCP deputies Yoshio Shiga
and Ichizo Suzuki voted in the Diet for ratification of the partial
nuclear test-ban treaty, they were expelled by the pro-Peking majoritye
(Akahata, May 23, 196, in Peking Review, VII, 22 (May 29, 196,),
pp. 17-21.) Thereupon first Mosco~wPartiinaya Zhizn, No. 149 July 1964,
pp. 8-9) and then the JCP (Akahata, A ut 8, 1964 and September 2,
1964) in Peking ReviewfV,3 Seeber 11, 1964), pp 27-28 and
VII, 38 (SeptemberI87 196)4), pp0 12-19 published a long exchange of
letters between the two and polemics on both sides intensified greatly.
opposed the Soviet call for a conference but called for resumption
of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks and did not mention polemics.4 8
The summer of 1964 also saw the most explicit elaboration to
date of Chinese foreign policy with respect to the two areas of
the world they hope to mobilize against their two enemies, the
Soviet Union and the United States: the underdeveloped world of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the capitalist states of
Western Europe and Japan,
Chinese policy toward the underdeveloped areas was elaborated
at a series of Afro-Asian Economic Seminars by their spokesman Nan
Han-chen, who generalized the Chinese model of economic development
for all underdeveloped countries. In a speech at the Second Seminar
at Pyongyang on June 20, Nan struck the keynote-
0 0 . The fundamental way of developing an inde-
pendent national economy is to carry on economic
construction on the basis of self-reliance. .
to rely mainly on the enthusiasm, initiative and
creativeness of the masses and o . the internal
resources and t accumulation of capital in the
country 4
48 Lao Dong CC April 21, 1964 circular letter to all CPvs,
ibido, P. 34,
NCNA English Pyongyang, June 20, 1964., in SCMP 3245, June 2)4,
1964, pp. 26-29o See also Peking Review, VII, 27 (July 3, 1964),
pp. 18-22, and a speech by Fang Yi at a June 16 Geneva meeting of
the Economic Preparatory Meeting for the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference,
ibido, VII, 26 (June 26, 1964), pp. 8-10. For a Soviet reply, see
Ko Dontsev, "Peking's False Tone," Iz ya July l2, 1964. For
Chinese economic aid policy, see Ai Ching-cnu, "China's Economic and
Technical Aid to Other Countries," Peking Review, VII, 3L (August 21,
1960), pp, 14-180
In other words, Peking recommended labor-intensive economic devel-
opment, plus, as Nan added, mutual Afro-Asian economic assistance
(and without either Soviet or American economic aid.) American
economic aid, he continued, was given in order to plunder the Afro-
Asian countries by keeping them underdeveloped and their raw mate-
rial resources in foreign capitalist hands, by manipulating the
terms of trade so as to keep prices of raw materials low and those
of imported finished goods high, and by cooperating with the "modern
revisionists" (i.e. the Soviet Union)to "manipulate the United Na-
tions or other world or regional economic organizations." In a
speech at another such seminar in Algiers in February 1965, Nan
added one further and quite un-Leninist note:
* . . The policy of a diversified economy with
food grains as the key link in developing agricul-
ture is . . . an important prerequisite for the
rapid development of the58ationai economy and steady
industrialization
That is, agriculture (and light industry) should have priority
over development of heavy industry: a model which was in any case
the only one to which most underdeveloped countries could aspire
in the near future,
50 NCNA English, Algiers, February 23, 1965, in ibid., VIII,
10 (March 5, 1964), pp. 16-26 and the seminar's general declaration,
ibid., VIII, 11 (March 12, 1965), pp. 17-19.
42
Chinese policy toward the capitalist states of Western Europe
and Japan was made most explicit by Mao himself in a July 10, 1964
interview with a group of Japanese socialists. It was also the
height of Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union, then and since. He
challenged the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union with respect
to all its acquisitions during and after World War II as well as all
the Tsarist acquisitions, for which "we have not yet presented the
bill." He appealed primarily to Japanese and West German irredent-
ist nationalism (with respect to the Kurile islands and the former
German territories east of the present Oder-Neisse East German-
Polish frontier.) Maoss assault was contained in the following
crucial paragraph:,
0 0 . There are too many places occupied by the
Soviet Union. In keeping with the Yalta agreement
the Soviet Union, under the pretext of insuring
Mongolia's independence,, actually placed this
country under its domination0 Mongolia takes up
an area which is considerably greater than the
Kurlies 0 In 1954 when Khrushchev and Bulganin
were in China we took up this question but they
refused to talk to us. They appropriated a part
of Romania. Having separated a portion of East
Germany they chased away the local inhabitants to
West Germany. They divided a part of Poland and
annexed it to the Soviet Union and gave a part of
East Germany to Poland as compensation. The same
thing took place in Finland. They took everything
they could. Some people have declared that the
Singkiang area and the territories north of the
Amur must be included in the Soviet Union. Thp,
USSR is concentrating troops along its border.I
51 Quoted from CDSP, XVI, 34 (September 16, 1964), pp. 6-7,
at Po 7.
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Seldom has Moscow been so menaced with so few words. The
revelation (confirmed later by Moscow) that in 1954 Mao had demanded
the return of Outer Mongolia indicated how long back his ambitions
reached and how early Sino-Soviet relations must have been soured
by Mao's ambitions. The reference to Bessarabia ("a part of
Romaniatt) showed how he hoped to use this Romanian irrendenta to
pry Bucharest farther away from Moscow The reference to the
Polish and German boundaries--the most crucial issue in Europe--
showed how Mao hoped to play Warsaw and Bonn against Moscow.
His previous assertion that the Kurile Islands belonged to Japan
closed the circle:* Mao's "second intermediate zone" policy means
a bouleversement des alliances: West Germany and Japan allied
with China against Moscow and Washington. He accused Khrushchev
of wanting to annex even more Chinese territory; and, finally,
by his assertion that "the USSR is concentrating troops along its
border," he intimated that military escalation, at least into
extensive border conflicts, might occur.
The Mao interview was never published in China,52 perhaps
because it sounded so pro-Japanese ("The Japanese nation is a great
nation"--exactly the same words General de Gaulle used in referring
to the German nationt). Although it was briefly reported in Japan
52 The NCNA news item, Jen-min Jih-pao, July 11, 196L (SCMP
3258, July 15, 1964) only reported that the conversation had taken
place.
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in mid-July53 and in full in mid-August,5 and Moscow must have
known of it then, it did not become known throughout the world
until Pravda republished it on September 2, along with a violent
rejoinder of its own.55 This indicated that the Soviets had tried
to get Peking to repudiate the interview, but that Deputy Foreign
Minister Wang Ping-nan had only replied that "if Mao Tse-tung said
so, he agreed with him." In addition, Chou En-lai had given an
August 1 interview to Asahi with "essentially . the same
ideas . 0 Pravda then declared that Mao by this interview
had made clear that he was
0 0 0 actually prepared to come to agreement with
anybody for the sake of the struggle against the
friends and allies of Peoplevs China--the Soviet
Union and other countries of socialism
Pravda did not attempt to conceal the seriousness of Mao's terri-
torial claims; on the contrary it set them forth in full and re-
affirmed the historical validity of the present Sino-Soviet
boundaries. To question them, it went on, would
00 . inevitably generate a whole series of mutual
demands, claims, and insoluble conflicts among
countries of Europe and Asia . 0 0 .
53 Asahi Evening News, July 13, 1964.
Sekai Shuho (Tokyo), August 11, 1964.
"Concerning Mao Tse-tung's Talk with Japanese Socialists,"
Pravda, September 2, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 34 (September 16,
1967), pp. 3-7.,
As to the Kuriles, Pravda hinted that if Japan were no longer an
American base some agreement might be reached about them. It
concluded by declaring that Maovs demand was reminiscent of those
of his "predecessors" for Lebensraum-,-obviously Hitler.
In September Khrushchev replied to the Mao interview by
declaring
. . . the Chinese leaders are . . . all but
proposing the division o 6the territory of
the Soviet Union . . . .
that Moscow now had a weapon of unlimited destructive power (a
declaration not reproduced in the Soviet text of the interview)
and that Soviet frontiers were inviolable. As to Mao's interview,
he stated:
o o .Mao Tse-tung calls himself a Communist,
yet the philosophy he developed in his talk
is alien to the people of labor; it cannot be
the philosophy of a representative of the most
progressive revolutionary doctrine--communism 0 . .
Repeating the theme of the Pravda editorial, he added that
o 0 . given todays weapons of annihilation, it is
especially dangerous, I might even say criminal,
to seek wealth through the expansion of Lebensraum . . .
True, he continued, the Tsars had annexed territory, but so had the
Chinese Emperors:
In a speech in Prague, September L, 1964, in Pravda, September 5,
1964,, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 36 (September 30, 196), p-p 6-8, at P. 7.
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0 o Take Sinkiang, for example. Have Chinese
really lived there since time immemorial? The
indigenous population of Sinkiang differs sharply
from the Chinese in ethnic, linguistic, and other
respects,, It is made up of Uigurs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz
and other peoples. The Chinese emperors subjugated
them in the past and deprived them of their inde-
pendence . 0 0 0
The threat was clear: Moscow could stir up trouble for the Chinese
in Sinkiang. (The Chinese have often charged the Russians with
doing just this0 )5 '
The Chinese also had no difficulties with their allies about
the conference, concerning which their extreme, unconditional sup-
porters in any case shared their views,, while their moderate,
conditional allies, such as the Indonesian Communist Party, were
opposed to it for the same reasons as the Italian and Romanian
Communists: it would split the international Communist movement
and therefore diminish their bargaining power vis-&vis their major
ally--for these Asian Communists, China. The Japanese Communists,
threatened by Soviet support of their dissident minority, continued
their anti-Soviet polemics.58
For the statement re a weapon of unlimited destructive power,
see AFP from Moscow, Le Monde., September 17, 1964; for Khrushchev's
statement that he was misquoted, Pravda, September 22, 196 (his speech
to the World Youth Forum,) Soviet text- Pravda, September 20, 1964,
quoted from CDSP, XVI, 38 (October 14, 1967,pp. 3-7.
58 -I am grateful to Dr, Ruth McVey for discussions on the PKI.
See a PKI CC resolution, "Marxist-Leninists of the World Unite,
Continue to Smash Revisionism," Peking Review, VII, 5 (January 31,
1964), p0 17, On the Japanese CP, see the exchange of letters with
the CPSU cited in ftn ,47, supra, and 9TO Timofeyev and American
Imperialism," Akahata, February 26, 1965, (JPRS 29,9426, April 5, 1965.)
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Opposition by Pro-Soviet Parties to Moscow's Conference Project
Those pro-Soviet communist party leaderships opposed to an
international conference wanted more autonomy from the CPSU and
therefore feared attempts by Moscow, as in 1957 and 1960, to use
such a conference to reestablish its control. Moreover the nation-
alism in their countries, intensified in some by ethnic and minority
problems or traditional hatred of Russia, made decline in Soviet
influence helpful in strengthening their own domestic appeal. Con-
versely, in some countries proximity to the Soviet Union, need for
Soviet support against other enemies, or traditional pro-Soviet
sentiments in their parties restrained their opposition to Soviet
desires.59
1. Romania was both the most opposed to the conference and
in the strongest position to resist it. Traditional anti-Russian
feelings, the Bessarabian irredenta, the determination of Romanian
Communists to industrialize rather than remain a source of raw
materials for CMEA, rich resources saleable on the world market
(oil, grain, and timber), a tightly-knit, nativist, and ruthless
party leadership, and a skill at intrigue inherited from the Byzan-
tines and Phanariots--all these enabled Gheorghiu-Dej to maneuver
For a perceptive communist analysis, see Mieczyslaw F.
Rakowski /e'ditor of Polytika and PZPR CC candidate member7 in Kamena
(Lublin),7No0 1/2, January 31, 1965, ppe 1, 10 (JPRS 29,309, March
26, 1965.) It should also be noted that organizational consequences
often occurred: eg,. in late October 1964 at the Budapest WFTU
General Council meeting, Cuba, Romania, and Italy abstained on the
vote on a unity appeal, while China and her allies opposed. (Oggi
in Italia /Clandestine7 in Italian to Italy, October 25, 1964,
1930 GMT.)
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between the Russians and the Chinese to his, and Romaniat s, advantage.60
Bucharest had been largely responsible for the delay in the February
1964 Soviet attempt to summon a conference; it had openly opposed the
September- October 1963 one; and it had altogether gone the farthest
in defiance of Moscow.
By April 1964 Romania had successfully sabotaged Khrushchev's
plan for supranational planning within CMEA,, 61 Romania's foreign
trade pattern had been diversified so that the country was no longer
so vulnerable to Soviet economic pressure. Bucharest was rapidly
improving its relations with Western Europe and the United States
and de-emphasizing Russian and increasing Western cultural influence.
Further, the Romanians had clearly established a special position
in Sino-Soviet affairs: support for Moscow on the substantive
policy and issues; opposition to a split and to a pro-Soviet inter-
national conference; refusal to attack China publicly; mediation
between Moscow and Peking while simultaneously cementing good rela-
tions with the Italian, Polish, and Yugoslav parties. Then at the
60 Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp, 37-,41, 185-186 (with
bibliography); John Michael Montias, ",Background and Origins of the
Rumanian Dispute with COMECON," Soviet Studies, XVI, 2 (October 1964),
pp. 125-151; J. F. Brown, "Eastern Europe," Survey, No. 54 (January
1965), reprinted in Leopold Labedz, ed., International Communism
After Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.IoT. Press, 1965), pp 65-88;
C. K. LChristian Kind] , "Rmanilens industrielles Aufbauprogramm,"
Neue Zu"rcher Zeitung, June 11, 1964; Viktor Meier, "Riumaniens Selbst-
andigkeit im Ostblock," May 9, 12, 15, 19, 22, 25, 1965 and "Ann)aIherung
Bukarests an Prag," :bid. , May 11, 1965
61 See, e.g., the careful compromise formulae in Piotr Jarosiewicz,
"The Council for Mutual Economic Aid-an Instrument of Cooperation Be-
tween Socialist Countries," World Marxist Review, VII, 3 (March 196),
pp. 3-8 and Stanislaw Kuzinski, "Specialization of Production in the
World Socialist System," ibid. VII, 6 (June 1964), pp. 18-230
L9
end of April the Romanian position was made explicit with the
publication and wide distribution of a "Statement" endorsed by an
enlarged Central Committee plenum.62
After detailing Romanian attempts at mediation, the statement
took the Soviet side on all the substantive issues in the dispute.
However, it condemned Moscow as well as Peking, although neither by
name, for the violence of their polemics and for their attempts to
remove each otherls leadership. Peking was especially censured for
its thesis of the inevitability of splits and for its factional
activities. However, more importantly, with respect to the CMEA
issue the statement was clearly if implicitly anti-Soviet. It
flatly rejected multilateral economic integration as incompatible
with national sovereignty, and it declared that "distinctive national
and state features" would continue "even when socialism has triumphed
on a world scale or at least in most countries," All socialist coun-
tries, it went on, should be members of CMEA (thereby adding to
Romania's potential allies within the organization), and there should
be some kind of participation possible for underdeveloped countries
("the path of non-capitalist development"); ie. Romania, like
Yugoslavia, wanted to diversify its alliances.63 Finally, after
62 "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers? Party
Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class
Movement," Scinteia, April 27, 1964 (English translation: Bucharest:
Meridiane, 196)hereafter cited as "Statement "7,
63~ And it did: at the June 1964 Geneva UN World Trade
Conference Romania voted with and tried to join the group of 75
underdeveloped countries. See East Europe, XIII, 7 (July 1964), p. 47
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sharply criticizing Stalin for the great purges and for his break
with Tito (that is, opposing any recurrence of either) the statement
concluded with a call for the end of polemics and for bilateral
Sino-Soviet discussions in order to set up a "commission . . . of
representatives of a number of parties,'t and only thereafter a
"thoroughly prepared" international conference with "1all" parties
participating. 64 In effect the statement took the Chinese position
on the preparatory committee and the conference and implied strongly
that Romania would not attend a Soviet-summoned international meeting.
In sum therefore it was indeed a Romanian declaration of independence
from Moscow,65
During the summer and early autumn of 1964 Soviet-Romanian
relations worsened still further, and it became increasingly certain
that the Romanians would not participate in the Soviet-sponsored
conference. Bucharest polemicized against Soviet articles and radio
broadcasts6 6 (whereupon Moscow retreated67) and censored the Romanian
64 Quoted from "Statement," pp. 30-32, 52-53.
65 Even so, the strength and subtlety of Bucharest's position
was demonstrated by the fact that Moscow evidently felt compelled to
publish even a carefully edited summary of the statement in World
Marxist Review, VII, 7 (July 1964), pp. 60-64.66I
"Concepts Contrary to the Basic Principles Guiding Economic
Relations Between Socialist Countries," Via a Economica, No. 2)4, 1964
(reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, July 26, 196 and Peking Review, VII, 31
July 31, 196 , ppo 2 -l0 attacking E. B0 Valev, "Problems of the
Economic Development of the Danube Districts of Rumania, Bulgaria, and
the UOSoS.RO," Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, No. 2, March-April 1964
and the Fourth Congress of the Soviet Society of Geography, May 25-30,I
1964; and (for radio polemics) Radio Moscow in Romanian, May 30, 1964,
and Radio Bucharest, June 5, 1964 and C. K. /Christian Kind7, "Rumanische-
sowjetische Meinungsverschiedenheiten," Neue~Zircher Zeitung, June 9, 1964,.67 0 Gobomolov, "Study in Greater Depth of the Problems of Coopera-
tion Among the Socialist Countries," Izvestiya, July 4, 1964.
edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism.68 Frequent Soviet-
Romanian negotiations apparently came to nothing,6 9 and even Tito's
urging Gheorghiu-Dej to be cautious did not improve the situation.7 0
Romania continued to expand its contacts with the West and its moves
toward limited domestic liberalization (release of political pris-
oners, rise in wages, price cuts). In August both Soviet and
Chinese delegations attended the Bucharest liberation celebration.7 2
2. The Italian Communist Party's effective resistance to the
Soviet conference plan was a second blow to Moscow's position within
the international Communist movemento The PCI's long-term goals are
incompatible with Soviet domination of the Communist world0 The
Italian Communists want (a) an increase in electoral power, toward
which they are working by professing a revisionist program and by
weakening the unpopular PCI alignment with Moscow, thus decreasing
68 "Les Roumains censurent la revue de Praguev," Est et ouest,
XVI, 328 (October 16-31, 1964), p. 50
69 E. g.,, C. K. /Christian Kind7, "Moskaus Werburg um Rumdnien,"
Neue Zrcher Zeitung, May 29, 1964 and Vc M. /iiktor Meier7 from Moscow
in ibid., July 8, 16, 1964.
70 See a Vienna dispatch /by Dessa Bourne7 in The Times (London),
June 8 1964.
Reuters from Geneva, Neue Ztircher Zeitung, June 14, 1964;
Geneva dispatch in The New York Times, June 7, 1964.
72 Bucharest, clearly at least as independent of Moscow as
Belgrade, appeared by October to be moving toward even looser rela-,
tions with the Soviet Union0 The Chinese were of course jubilant,
as well they might be0 They had contributed toward the greatest
blow to Soviet influence in East Europe since the Soviet-Yugoslav
break in 1948.
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its clash with Italian nationalism; (b) primacy in West European
communism; and (c) a major role, not only in Western Europe but
also in the underdeveloped world, in a pluralistic international
Communist movement. To further these goals Togliatti used his
great personal prestige, his experience in international communism,
7;and all the habilita of Machiavelli , "
As early as January 1964 Togliatti said publicly that Tito
joined him in expressing "many reservations" on an international
conference. Just before the publication of the Suslov report,
Mario Alicata declared that any attempt to "excommunicate" and
"expel" a party would be "unacceptable to uso "75
Later that same month Toglia1-ti was even more specific: 3
0 o When people began to talk about holding a
new conference of all Communist parties, to
examine and judge the position held by the Chi-
nese comrades- . . this could result . . .
in an excommunication ; this, it seemed to
us, would be useless and harmful
He made clear the basis of the FCI's fears:
The method of solemn excommunication
contains . . . the danger of a resurgence of
authoritarian and sectarian systems in the
leadership of individual parties
See Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 179; Giorgio Galli,
"Italian Communism in William Eo Griffith, Communism in Europe,(Cambridge, Mass.- The M1I.T. Press, 1964), Vol. I, PP. 301-34
and for more recent developments, Eric Willenz and Pio Uliassi,
"Western Europe," Survey, No. 54 (January 1965), and Labedz, op.
ctt, pp. 51-64, at pp. 58-64, and Kevin Devlin, "The Italian
Position," "The PCI's Ideological Diplomacy," and. "The Independent
Italiana, " RFE/Munich, May 6, 1964, July 17, 1964, and May 18,
1965, respectively.
74 Togliatti's press conference in Belgrade, L'Unita, January 22, 1964.
75 Ibid., April 1, 1964.
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Rather, he declared, there should be "a series of bilateral or group
meetings" (that is, a West European one, for example, with the PCI
taking the lead), based on the conception of international Communism
as Ita movement united by a profound solidarity but open to necessary
diversities and to the circulation of ideas l . ." In June he
called for an international communist aggiorniamento:
0 0 0 autonomy, unless it is to develop into iso-
lation, or still worse., into a centrifugal tendency,
must postulate not only the diversity of position,
but profound, reciprocal recognition, tolerance,
debate, and comparison, which, however, does not
mean condemnation and breaking of relations at
every turn . . . . we can be effective in our
struggle only by giving the entire movement a plan
which is pr oundly different from the traditional
one.o o
Furthermore, the PCI proposed "reviig and expanding numerous
parts" of the November 1960 Moscow Declaration, particularly with
respect to Yugoslavia and such national liberation movements as
the new Algerian socialist party." 7 7 Finally, the PCI flatly
rejected Khrushchev's "new organizational forms"-,
o o We shall not combat effectively the myth of
monolithism by seeking an agreement that would again
render rigid the workers' movement at precisely
76 From an interview with Togliatti in Rinascita, XXI, 26
(June 27, 1964), p. 9 (JPRS 25,576,9 July 24, 1964, pp. 53-56.)
77 Contro il dogmatismo," L'Unith, May 24, 1964 (JPRS 25,316,
June 30, 1964, pp. 36-39.)
those points where it has 78tarted to advance
toward renovation 0
Thus, although Togliatti reaffirmed his support of Moscow and
his opposition to China in the substantive issues of the dispute,
he was clearly not prepared to participate in Khrushchev's mobili-
zation toward collective "political isolation" of the Chinese.
The PCI also continued to develop and expand its revisionist
program. In April 1964 one of its major left-wing figures, Pietro
Ingrao, declared that organized non-socialist parties should exist
after the PCI comes to power9 and in July another article in
Rinascita went even further in rejecting Lenin's theory of the
state.80 Nor did the visits of several PCI delegations to Moscow
change the Italian position.
In August Togliatti himself went to the Soviet Union, where,
after inconclusive discussions with Brezhnev and Ponomarev in
Moscow, he prepared a memorandum for his scheduled talks with
Khrushchev 8 1 Before meeting with Khrushchev he was stricken with
a fatal heart attack. In spite of Brezhnev's attempt at the funeral
in Rome to persuade him not to, Togliatti's successor Luigi LongoI
Gian Carlo Pajetta, "Llerrore dei comunisti cinesi," Rinascita,
XXI, 38 (September 26, 1964), pp. 1-2 (JPRS 27,635, October 22, 19644)
Pietro Ingrao, "Democrazia socialista e democrazia interna di
partito,"' Rinascita, Vol0 XXI, No0 17 (April 25, 196), po 3-6(JPRS 24,7~1 ~May 26, 1964,)
Luciano Gruppi, "Le tesi di Lenin e di Engels sullo Stato,"t
Rinascita, XXI, 30 (July 25, 1964), pp. 27-28o
See an interview with his "compagna" Jotti, L'Unith, October
23, 1964.
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encouraged by the Yugoslavs, Poles, and Romanians, decided to pub-
lish the memorandum since generally known as the "Togliatti
Testament." 8 2
More than any other single document this marked the decline
in Soviet power and influence in the international Communist movement.
Not that it said anything strikingly new about the PCIs policies:
rather, it was a codification of the accumulation of Italian Commu-
nist heterodoxy. But its publication under such dramatic circum-
stances, plus the fact that Moscow republished it and took issue
with it only very indirectly, made clear to the world that Moscow
was increasingly becoming a paper tiger.
Togliatti began by declaring that the PCI would Otake part
actively" in the proposed conference. Yet this was only a formal
concession: he made clear that the PCI would come to the conference
to oppose (and, he implied, would refuse to accept) Soviet aims;
moreover it would advance its own position. The PCI, he went on,
would prefer, first, "objective and persuasive" polemics with
Peking, then a series of regional meetings during Ua year or more,"
and only then an international meeting which, "if it were to appear
82 "Promemoria sulle questioni del movimento operaio inter-
nazionale e della sua unith" Rinascita, XXI, 3$ (September 5, 1964),
ppo 1-; also in L Unith and The New York Times, September 5, 1964;
see Devlin, "From Memorandum to Testament," and "Togliattils Testa-
ment: Challenge to Moscow," RFE/Munich, both September 10, 1964,;
Kx. /'Ernst Kux7, "TogliattiS politische Testament," Neue Ziircher
Zeitung, September 15, 1964; Robert F. Lamberg, 'tDas politische
Testament Palmiro Togliattis,t Aussenpolitik, XV, 12 (December 1964),
ppo 8L9-856.
6necessary in order to avoid a formal split , , one could also
renounce."t Furthermore, he continued, in fact not nearly enough
practical steps had been taken against Chinese factionalism.
Communist parties should meet with non-Communist radical nationalist
groups in underdeveloped countries for this purpose (a hint of the
PCI's view that the latter should really be included in any unity.)
The CCP could not be excluded from international Communism,
Togliatti maintained, if only because Chinese cooperation is
necessary against imperialism. Moreover a split would lead to
much too great a concentration on the struggle against Peking.
He flatly rejected "any proposal to create once again a centralized
international organization)' Rather he postulated that "unity in
diversity" should be obtained by
0 0 . rather frequent contacts and exchange of
experiences among the parties on a broad scale,
convocation of collective meetings dedicated to
studying common problems by a certain group of
parties, international study meetings on general
problems of economy, philosophy, history, etc. . I . .
plus objective "discussions," not personalized polemics (but not
silence on existing differences.)
Thus Togliatti voiced what had been the Yugoslav position
since Stalin's break with Tito: a Communist "commonwealth" with
no more formally binding links than the British. He specifically
indicated that he was opposed both to excessive nationalism and to
"forced exterior uniformityt among Communist states,
Togliatti's blow to Soviet authority was even greater, however,
in that he sharply criticized Soviet internal affairs. He revived
his 1956 thesis that not just Stalinis personality was responsible
for Stalinism; he advocated "open debates on current problems" by
leaders of Communist states3 and, he took exception to the Soviet
"Islowness and resistance" in returning to "a wide liberty of ex-
pression and debate on culture, art, and also on politicstl
Nor did Togliatti's death bring any modification in the PClIs
opposition to the Soviet conference objectives. On the contrary,
the fact that Moscow and almost all other pro-Soviet parties pub-
lished the Togliatti testament strengthened the Italian position. 8
Immediately before Khrushchev's fall, in a report to a PCI Central
Committee Plenum, Enrico Berlinguer proudly declared:
0 0 0 the prestige of the PCI is today greater
than ever before in the past
and pronounced the end of Soviet hegemony:
0 0 . The moment has come to realize that the
situation has changed, to get rid of any nos-
talgia, to recognize that the kind of unity
which we want to build tomorrow is and will
have to be in the future a unity that recog
nizes differences as inevitable and accepts
these differences without leading to any con-
demnations , . 0 0
3 Pravda, September 10, 1964. See Giuliano Pajetta, "Il
dibattito internazionale sul documento di Yalta," Rinascita, XXI,
39 (October 3, 1964), p. 9 and Luigi Longo, "The Italian Communist
Party and Problems of the International Communist Movement,"
World Marxist Review, VII,, 11 (November 1964), PP. 3-100
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Another speaker, Luciano Gruppi, one of the most revisionist PCI
leaders, put the case for Italian (and, for that matter, Chinese)
"national communism" very precisely and in so doing took the same
position against a ban on factionalism as do the Chinese:
One thing which we cannot accept is the
principle of a majority which would. be in a
position to force the minority to accept its
decisions; this principle was valid when there
was an international organization but it can
no longer be valid today when it would signify 84
a limitation of the autonomy of the parties
3. Yugoslavia, not surprisingly, was the first to reprint
and endorse the Togliatti testament85 The near-identity of
Italian and Yugoslav Communist policy on the proposed international
conference had been clear ever since Khrushchev first launched the
idea in September 1963. Tito never endorsed it at any time. 8 6
Yet, for several reasons, Yugoslav statements on the issue were
much fewer and less precise than Italian ones. First, Yugoslavia
was not, since it had not been in 1960, a member of the 26-nation pre-
paratory committee; it therefore did not need to take a position
about either the committee meeting or its composition. Secondly,
84 L'Unita, October 15, 1964 (JPRS 279 299, November 5, 1964).
85 Politika, September 5 and 6, 1964.
86 Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 182-183; Viktor Meier,
"Yugoslav Communismi in Griffith) Communism in Europe, Vol. I,
pp. 19-64, and his running coverage in Neue Zu'rcher Zeitung; Anatol
Shab, "Moscow Summer, Belgrade Winter. The Case of Mihajlo
Mihajlov," Encounter, XXIV, 6 (June 1965), pp. 81-91,
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largely because of internal economic troubles and a rising nation-
alities problem, Tito was anxious to continue his post-196 0 rapproche-
ment with Khrushchev, Consequently he was disinclined to take a
clearly anti-Soviet position on the conference issue. Thirdly, he
could well afford to let the Romanians and Italians express what
was also his opposition, the more so since their success and the
subsequent Soviet retreat had made clear by summer 1964 that Tito
need not fear Soviet attempts to reimpose tighter control on East
Europe, thereby making the price of his rapprochement with Moscow
the endangering of Yugoslav internal autonomy and external maneuver-
ability. Fourth, Tito feared to attract Moscow's opposition to his
still active goal (dating from 1945-1948) of asserting Yugoslav
influence in the Balkans, He therefore preferred that loosening
of Soviet control, and the resultant greater opportunities for
Belgrade, be initiated elsewhere. Indeed, during the summer of
1964 Tito appears to have feared that Gheorghiu-Dej might be risking
Soviet intervention in Romania, for after a hastily-arranged meeting
with Khrushchev in Leningrad Tito reportedly soon thereafter con-
ferred with Gheorghiu-Dej in order to caution him to go more
slowly in asserting Romanian independence.
87 For a significant Soviet pro-Yugoslav article, see "Yugoslav
Today,," World Marxist Review, VII, 3 (March 1964), pp. 65-73.
88 AFP from Belgrade, Le Monde, June 27, 1964; Bourne from
Vienna in The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 19640
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4. Poland's opposition to Khrushchev's conference plans was
the cautious one of any East European state that did not totally
support the Soviet proposal. Gomul'ka, like most Poles, remains
convinced that raison di etat (the guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line
against Germany) requires a Polish-Soviet alliance. Yet he wishes
to prevent a renewed Soviet attempt to reimpose its control on
Poland. 9 0 Moreover, as a convinced Communist--one of the few, as
the Warsaw joke goes, in Poland--Gomu22ka is undoubtedly appalled by
the disarray of the international Communist movement and strongly
opposed to a Sino-Soviet split, the more so because he is so anxious
to prevent factional strife in Warsaw.
Gomulkais real position became clear, if only between the
lines, in his speech at the mid-June 1964 Fourth Polish Party
Congress. There, after a long but relatively non-polemical rejec-
tion of the Chinese views, he declared that not Peking but "a
majority" of Communist parties should determine when preparations
for a conference should begin, that is, Poland would, like the
Italian Communists, attend the conference. He went on:
0 . .In the present situation it seems expedient
to start in the very near future preparations for
a conference with the participation of the parties
89 See Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 184-185 and Hansjakob
Stehle, "Polish Communism," in Griffith, Communism in Europe, Vol. I,
PP. 85-176.
90 The small group of Polish Stalinists condemned at the
Fourth PZPR Congress were not pro-Chinese, although they may have
been in contact with the Chinese or Albanian embassies in Warsaw.
See the excerpts from their clandestine pamphlet in East Europe,
XIV, 3 (March 1965), pp. 7-15. 3
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representing the most important areas of the
world. A committee composed of such parties
would carry out preliminary discussions, which,
having been discussed within individual parties
and among parties, would be the9 lasis of the
future joint resolutions .
"The most important areas of the world"--who would represent
East Asia, the CCP and its allies having refused to attend? Only
the pro-Soviet Dange Indian CP? Clearly, Gomulka was trying to
stall, as indicated by his elaborate procedure for discussions of
drafts. Furthermore the advance text of the speech released to
correspondents contained a passage, which Gomuka did not deliver,
to the effect that parties not attending the conference would "put
themselves in the pale of the international movement."9 2  Perhaps
he cut it because he gave the speech on June 15, the same day that
the Soviet letter of that date, explicitly calling for a conference,
was dispatched. Contemporary accounts from Warsaw reported signs93
that Gomuka and his associates were greatly disturbed by the pre-
emptory tone of the letter. Not surprisingly, the subsequent
Polish congress resolutions contained no mention of the conference.94
Clearly, Warsaw was giving only the most reluctant and minimal coop-
eration to Khrushchev's international conference plans.
91 Trybuna Ludu, June 16, 1964.
92 Brown, "Eastern Europe," op. cit., at P. 77, ftn. 7.
K. S. Karol, "Le nouveau drame de 'Wieslaw' Gomulka,t
Le Monde, July 3, 1964.
Trybuna Ludu, June 25, 196.
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5. Cubas leader Castro was, like most Asian Communists,
out of sympathy with Khrushchev on the key issues of peaceful versus
revolutionary transition to socialism and of detente with the United
States. Castro wanted to replace Moscow as the decisive influence
over Latin American Communism, despite hi1s dependence on Moscow
for massive and essential economic aid and realization that a
Communist Cuba could hope for none but Soviet military protection
against Washington. His disagreement with Khrushchev~s policy of
d6tente became even clearer after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
and with the Cuban refusal to sign the Moscow partial test ban
treaty.0 5 On the other hand, Castrois 1963-1964 visits to Moscow
had brought the public Cuban position on the Sino-Soviet dispute
still closer to Khrushchevvs, presumably as the price for increased
Soviet economic aid. Castro did not want a Sino-Soviet split; yet
he could not afford directly to oppose Soviet desiresc He therefore
continued his ban on public discussion of Sino-Soviet differences
in Cuba. In view of subsequent developments one may assume that the
Soviets were making some concessions to Castro, possibly with respect
to Cuban influence over Latin American communism and the "violent
road." In any case, whether spurred by Soviet concessions or econ-
omic necessity, Cuban President Dorticos intimated in early October
For the above, see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, ppo 198-
202 (with bibliography) and Ernst Halperin, "Latin America,t Survey,
No. 54 (January 1965), and Labedz, op. cit., pp, 154-1670
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that Cuba would attend the proposed preparatory committee meeting.
By then, however, Castro hardly needed to worry that such a con-
ference would produce the split he wanted to avoid.
6. As for the rest of the international Communist movement,
the British, Norwegian, and Swedish parties, small, threatened by
affluence and major social democratic parties, and therefore in-
creasingly revisionist and factionalized, were anxious to keep the
Sino-Soviet dispute out of their ranks and consequently were notably
unenthusiastic about the Soviet plans for a conference. However,
their lack of size and influence made their wishes relatively un-
important in Soviet considerations. 9 7
96 In an interview in Cairo with Eric Rouleau, Le Monde,
October 11-12, 1964.
Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 179-182 (with bibliog-
raphy); Willenz and Uliassi, op. cit., pp. 50-54; running analyses
by Kevin Devlin of RFE/Munich and his "Schism and Secession,t
Survey, No. 54 (January 1965) and Labedz, op. cit., pp. 29-50;
chapters on Scandinavian Communism in William E. Griffith, ed.,
Communism in Europe, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T.
Press, forthcoming.)
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The Soviet Retreat
That Khrushchev would again abandon his international confer-
ence plans, as in October 1963, was most unlikely. With the pub-
lication of the Suslov report and the Central Committee resolution
in April he had gone too far, But his retreat, although more con-
cealed, was no less great; by mid-June he had clearly been forced
to abandon his main objective of "collective mobilization" against
the Chinese.
In early April Khrushchev had spoken of tightening multi-
party ties within the pro-Soviet camp in order to better combat
the Chinese factionalism.o By early June an Izvestiya article
had already scaled this down to ?a periodically functioning confer-
ence of Ministers" 9 9 -typical of CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization; while an article in Partiinaya Zhizn not only drew
no organizational conclusions but also, while reaffirming the
"Leninist principle of the subordination of the minority to the
majority," and reiterating Khrushchevis favorite phrase that parties
should "vIsynchronize watches,)" concluded by declaring only that
.D . if a party finds itself in isolation or in
the minority on any question., the authoritative
98SSee p 37~, vrj
"On the Nature of Relations between Socialist Countries: The
Policy of Unity Against the Policy of Schism.," Izvestiya, June 6,
1964, quoted from CDSP, Vol. XVI, No. 23 (July 1, 1964), pp. 5-7,
at p. 6,
opinion of the majority must prompt it to self-
criticism, to a careful rechecking of its posi%
tions . 0 . .100
In June a Soviet propagandist hinted that Peking could not necessarily
count on Moscow's support in any "terrible hour of trial." 10 1
On June 15 Moscow sent a letter to the Chinese that was in
reality intended to gain support among other parties. With respect
to substantive issues it unequivocally declared that Peking was
attempting to form its own bloc in order to split the movement, and
it denounced Chinese great-power chauvinism. On procedural issues,
it insisted that the "overwhelming majority" of Communist parties
favored an international conference "twithout delay"; that those
parties with reservations had them only about the timing because
of the Chinese position; that only the Chinese and Albanians were
opposed in toto (a far from true statement); and that no one party
could prevent the holding of such a conferenceo The letter indicated
some willingness to compromise on the date but flatly rejected the
Chinese proposal of four or five years delay. Moreover the Soviets
also rejected the attendance of pro-Chinese groups. With respect
to the substance of the conference, however, Khrushchevis retreat
1 0 0
'Against Splitters, For Unity of the Communist Movement,"
Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 11, June 1964, pp. 8-20, reprinted, slightly
abridged, in Pravda, June 3 and 1, 196, quoted from CDSP, XVI,
22 (June 214, 196~ Pp. 3-85, at P. 7.
101 Yury Zhukov, "The Chinese Wall," Pravda, June 21, 1964,
quoted from CDSP, XVI, 25 (July 16, 196), p 3~1, at P. 4.
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was plain. The letter declared that Moscow wished to concentrate
on what "unites" Communist parties, on normalization rather than
aggravation of differences, More significant, it admitted that the
conference "will not immediately manage . 0 0 to arrive at a common
opinion on all questions" and declared that parties should nonethe-
less cooperate on positions held in "common" and Itrefrain in the
future from any action that would aggravate the difficulties,"
thereby avoiding any chance of a split or worsening of differences.
There was no more talk of a "collective rebuff" of the Chinese,
nothing about tightening the ties between pro-Soviet parties:
rather, phrases reflecting the Italian, Romanian, and Yugoslav
"exchanges of views" formulae instead of Khrushchev's April views0 1 0 2
Although the Chinese did not formally reject the Soviet
June 30 letter a month thereafter, their publication on July 13,
one year after the 1963 Soviet "Open Letter," of their ninth
"Comment" thereon made clear that their position was hardening.
Entitled "On Khrushchev s Phony Communism and Its Historical
Lessons for the World," it was ideologically the most original
and significant of the whole series. It addressed itself to two
general areas:, the embourgeoisement of Soviet society and the
future course of Communism in China,
102 CPSU CC to CCP CC, Kommunist, No. 10, July 1964, pp. 9-20,
and Pravda, July 17, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 30 (August 19,
1964) pp. 5-10, at pp. 5-6. See also the even more general article
by Boris Ponomarev, "Proletarian Internationalism-~a Powerful Force
in the Revolutionary Transformation of the World," World Marxist
Review, VII, 8 (August 196), pp. 59-70, and the rejection of
"excommunication" by Y. Tsedenbal and 0. Vargas in ibid.,, VII, 9
(September 1964), p 3-10 and 11-14.
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The "comment"Is treatment of the "restoration of capitalism"
in the Soviet Union was in the best tradition of Machajski, Mosca,
Trotsky, and Djilas. After having reiterated the Chou Yang thesis
that the class struggle between bourgeois and proletarian elements
and therefore the danger of the restoration of capitalism remained
great during the "very, very long historical stage" of socialism,
it declared that the
. . activities of the bourgeoisie C con-
stantly breed political degenerates in the ranks
of the working class and Party and government
organizations, new bourgeois elements and embezz-
lers and grafters in state enterprises owned by
the whole people and new bourgeois intellectuals 0 .
These are the "social base of revisionism." But, the article
continued,
0 . .the gravity of the situation lies in the
fact that the revisionist Khrushchev clique have
usurped the leadership of the Soviet Party and
state and that a privileged bourgeois stratum
has emerged in Soviet society . 0 . .
This in turn has led to 'an unprecedented danger of capitalist
restorationt and to "an irreconcilable and antagonistic class
contradiction" between Khrushchev and his privileged stratum and
the masses of the Soviet people.
Given this Chinese view of Soviet "degeneration," the most
extreme until that date, the article contrasted it with the most
ascetic, grim, and fanatical view of China 2 s future which Peking--
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and, in this instance, Mao personally, in fifteen points--had ever
set forth. Transition to communism., Mao declared, will take "any-
where from one to several centuries." To prevent bourgeois degen-
eration during this long period, physical labor for cadres must be
continued, incomes must be leveled, army, militia, and police must
remain under strict party control, and above all great attention
must be paid to "the question of training successors for the revo-
lutionary cause of the proletariat . . . a matter of life and death
for our party , o for a hundred, a thousand, nay ten thousand
years 0 0 0 O,"C3
On July 28 the Chinese finally replied to the Soviet June 30
letter. Moscow had "laid down a revisionist political program and
a divisive organizational line" in order "arbitrarily, unilaterally,
and illegally" to call an international meeting to bring about "an
open split." After accusing Moscow of trying to subvert the Indian
and Japanese Communist Parties, and declaring that unamimity was
necessary for convening any international meeting, the letter con-
cluded: "We firmly believe that the day your so-called meeting
takes place will be the day you step into your own grave o0 0 "1l3
103 "On Khrushchevs Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons
for the World. Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of
the CPSU (9)," Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, July 13, 1964 and Peking
Review, VII, 29 (July 17, 1964), pp. 7-2 , at pp. 8, 9, 13, 15, 26.
Cf. An Tzu-wen, "Cultivating and Training Revolutionary Successors Is
the Strategic Task of the Party,," Hung Chii, No. 17/18, September 23,
1964, ppo 1-13 (JPRS 27,143, October 29, 196 )4)
10L Jen-min Jih-pao, July 31, 1964 and Peking Review, No0 31
(July 31, 1964), pp. II Peking simultaneously published the June 15,
1964 CPSU letter.
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Two days later, on July 30, the Soviets dispatched a circular
letter to the 26 participants in the 1960 preparatory committee
meeting summoning them to meet in Moscow on December 15, 1964.
The meeting would occur, the letter said, even if all parties sum-
moned did not attend. Even more explicitly than the previous June 30
letter, the Soviets stressed that the proposed meeting should not
lead to a split:
. 0 . The meeting will be called not to condemn
anybody, to "excommunicate" anybody from the
Communist movement and the socialist camp, to
attach insulting labels, or to throw irresponsible
charges . 0 0
The meeting would ttenrich and develop" (that is, not revise) the
1957 and 1960 declarations. Finally, the letter repeated the June 30
fonnulations about concentrating on areas of agreement and putting
differences aside.105
A month later, after charging Moscow with supporting the
American attempt to intervene in Vietnam via the United Nations
(the first clear signal of the growing importance of the
issue in Sino-Soviet affairs) the Chinese replied that:
105 Text: only in ibid.,, VIII, 13 (March 26, 196h), pp. 19-
20. The August 10, 196' Pravda editorial, "An International Con-
ference Is the Path to the Solidarity of the Communist Movement,"
which announced that the conference had been summoned, was much
more polemical in tone than the letter, but it added nothing sub-
stantively new to it,,
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the day in December 1964 on which you
convene your drafting committee will go down
in history as the day of the great split i10 6the international Communist movement .
By September the Soviet attitude toward the conference had
become increasingly ambivalent, reflecting, probably, some differ-
ences in the Soviet leadership concerning tactics about it. Al-
though Moscow published the Togliatti testament, it immediately, if
esoterically (in theses on the hundredth anniversary of the First
International) replied to its autonomist views by declaring that
0 0 . relations among the socialist states . . 3
cannot be limited merely to the principles of
complete equality, respect for territorial in-
tegrity, state independence and sovereignty,
and noninterference in one anothervs internal
affairs, although they do presuppose the full-
est and most consistent implementation of these
principles. They also presuppose fraternal
mutual aid and close cooperation among the
socialist states . I
Moreover, a new set of criteria for proletarian internationalism
was se t forth: I
o . In the activity of the International,3
along with certain historically transitory
organizational forms conditioned by the then-
existing stage in the development of the
106 SCMP 3293, September 4, 1964, PP, 33-35,
and Peking Review, VoL, vI, No. 36 (September L, 1964), pp. 6-7.
The Chinese simultaneously published the Soviet July 30 letter.
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international workers' movement, there were
expressed for the first time the most im-
portant organizational principles of prole-
tarian internationalism. They are:
--the duty to recognize the basic
principles of the International on
the part of all parties entering
into it;
-- the duty to observe the decisions
adopted within the framework of the
International, with the subordina-
tion of the minority to the will of
the majority-;
--the banning of factional schismatic
activity within the ranks of the
International.
These principles retain their importance in
our time as well 1 0 7
(Peking would reject all three principles, but the Italians and
Romanians would reject (and the Poles and others oppose) the
second as well; therefore Moscow must either break with them as
well or abandon it; and without it they could no longer enforce
their will.)
Later that month, at the Moscow celebration of the centenary
of the First International, Ponomarev declared., in another indirect
reply to the Togliatti testament, that:
o e . The desire to interpret the independence
of parties as a departure from the resolution of
107 Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee,
"100th Anniversary of the First International: 1864-1964 (Theses),"
Pravda, September 11, 196k, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 37 (October 7,
196)7, pp. 3-11, at pp. 8, 10, Cf. r. re g. /R. Rockingham Gill7,
"Theses on the First International," RFE/Munich, September 15, 1964.
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common international tasks, as some kind of
"neutrality" in coping with common causes,
cannot in the least be regarded as either a
sign of independence or a sign of maturity
However--and here the "objective" ambivalence became clear--he also
reiterated the CPSUis July 30 conciliatory line:
0 C . The goal of the new conference, as the
CPSU Central Committee understands it, lies
not in "excommunicating" anyone from the
Communist movement or in "severing" anyone
from it but in strengthening its unity, in
continuing the creative resolution of the
urgent problems of the world Communist move-
ment . . . .108
For the Western reader the Soviet dilemma may be clearer by
an analogy /esoteric, that is7 with the United Nations General As-
sembly /the international Communist movement o There the United
States /the Soviet Union7 until recently had an assured majority,
and the Russians ,/ghinese7 therefore refused to accept Assembly
decisions, but so did the French /the PCIO7 But if the Russians
/'hinese7 or French /Ttalians7 refuse to accept these decisions
there is little the United States the Soviets7 can do about it,
since the French /PCI7 and most other small nations fost of the
108 "Proletarian Internationalism Is the Revolutionary
Banner of Our Era," Pravda, September 29, 1964, quoted from CDSP,
XVT, 40 (October 28,7T9 , ppo 1-17, at po 17. Cf. the similar
Yuir.Andropov, "Proletarian Internationalism Is the Battle Flag of
th,. Communists," Kommunist, No. 14, September 1964 (passed for the
press, September 30, 196), ppo 11-26 (JPRS 27,133, October 28,
196.)
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pro-Soviet parties7 so fear the collapse of the United Nations
/International Communist movement! that they will not vote for the
Russiansv /Chinese7 or the French /TCI7 expulsion.
Meantime, Sino-Soviet rivalry in the underdeveloped areas
further intensified. Four aspects merit particular attention:
(1) organizational rivalries, (2) differences within the Soviet
leadership concerning tactics, (3) the role of other communist
parties, particularly the PCI, and (4) the Congo rebellion,
Sino-Soviet organizational rivalries in the underdeveloped
world centered around the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization,
and the preparations for the Second Afro-Asian Conference ("Second
Bandung.") In the former Peking continued its efforts to set up
and develop new Afro-Asian organizations from which Moscow would
be excluded. In the latter the Chinese succeeded in preventing
the acceptance of Moscow as a full member at the Jakarta preparatory
meeting, but the Soviets continued their efforts to achieve admission.1 0 9
109 For Soviet axclusion at Djakarta, see Chung Ho, "Triumph
of the Bandung Spirit" and the Djakarta communique, ibid., VII, 17
(April 24, 1964), pp. 5-7. For Sino-Soviet exchanges, see edi-
torials, the Soviet April 2L government statement (to the CPR)
on the Jakarta meeting, Pravda, May 5, 1964; a May 30 CPR statement,
Peking Review, VII, 23 (June -5, 1964), pp. 6-8, with accompanying
Pravda and Jen-min Jih-pao editorials, "Splitters' Maneuvers,"
Pravda, July 11, 196 4; and "In Whose Interests?" (re the Pyongyang
2nd Asian economic seminar), ibid., August 18, 1964. For background,
see W. A. C. Adie, "China and the Bandung Genie," Current Scene, III,
19 (May 15, 1965.)
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Khrushchev's December 1963 relativization of Soviet ideology
concerning "national democracy," the "construction of socialism,"
and participation of communists in ? revolutionary democratic"
states on the path of "non-capitalist development" has already been
mentionedl10 In spring and summer 1964 differences of opinion
within the Soviet leadership became apparent on these points,
centering on how favorable an attitude to take toward such "revo-
lutionary democratic" leaders as Ben Bella and Nasser, and to what
extent the wishes of Middle Eastern Communists should be subordi-
nated thereto. Khrushchev increasingly adopted the preference for
the former view of a group of young intellectuals in the Moscow
Institute for World Economy and International Affairs, while Suslov,
Ponomarev, and those responsible for dealing with communist parties
tended to support the latter. ill
The increasing, differentiated activities of other communist
parties in the underdeveloped world, made possible by their in-
creasing autonomy from Moscow, were particularly characteristic of
the Italian and Cuban parties. Cubavs activities centered on trips
by Guevara and others, intended to mobilize support against Washington
110 See ppol8-i9, supra,
For a penetrating and detailed analysis, with bibliographical
citations, particularly from the Institute s journal Mirovaya Ekonomika
i Mezhdunarodnyie Otnosheniya, see Raganan, op. cit. The same eclectic
position was increasingly taken toward European Social Democracy. See
A. Chernyayev, "Communists and Socialists: Prospects for Cooperation,!
Kommunist, No. 7, May 1964, PP 107-118. For the explicitly anti-CCP
aspects of the Khrushchev position, see Fuad Nassar and Aziz al-Hajj,
"The National Liberation Movement and the World Revolutionary Process,"
World Marxist Review, VII, 3 (March 1964), pp. 9-15; W. Sheppard
"The One-Party System and Democracy in Africa,"! ibid., pp. 86-903
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and to propagate the Cuban model of national liberation struggle.
The PCI was active particularly in North Africa, where its rela-
tions with the FLN were especially close, and also in Asia and
Latin America. As Togliatti's testament clearly showed, the PCI's
autonomist attitude with respect to international communist unity
inter alia extended that concept to include such revolutionary
national liberation movements as the FLN; i.e. the PCI abandoned
any unity composed exclusively of communist parties for a larger
one including revolutionary movements of all kinds. The PCI was
clearly sympathetic to Khrushchevvs views, and Togliatti went out
of his way in his testament to endorse them. (In fact, so did the
Chinese--another illustration of how organizational autonomists
relativize ideology from no matter what substantive position,)1 1 2
The 1964 "rebellion" in the Congo was largely tribal in
character, and its causes included social dislocation and economic
decline. Its leadership was mediocre and often pathological; and
it lacked strategy and sufficient external support. Although it
became more anti-literacy and racist as it developed, it was never
ideological in character nor centrally directed. The Russians,
restrained by the memories of their failures in Guinea in 1959 and
in the Congo in 1960, might well have continued their initial
reserve toward it had not Peking supported the rebel leaders Mulele,
112 For the PCI, see pp. 104-1KS and 127 infra. Yugoslav activity
became less significant as CPSU-LCY rapprochement intensified.
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Gbenya, and Soumaliot, from its enclaves of influence in Bujumbura,
Brazzaville, and elsewhere. Tshombe retaliated by throwing South
African white mercenaries, plus American planes and exile Cuban
pilots, into the fray, a move which aroused anti-American senti-
ments, notably in East Africa. Thereupon the Russians could no
longer resist both opportunity and Chinese competition. Even so,
they carefully did. not commit themselves openly or completely to
the "rebellion": they sent arms via Algiers and Cairo, and when
Tshombe's white mercenaries broke the organized rebellion, they
quietly ceased their support. Meanwhile, although the Chinese had
been thrown out, of Bujumbura and were meeting increased Soviet
(and French) competition, in Brazzaville, rising unrest in Tanzania
and Uganda continued tempting Peking, as Chou, En-lai's June 1965
visit to East Africa demonstrated. 113
113 See especially M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion,"
Africa Report, X, 4 (April 1965), pp. 6-11; Russell Warren Howe,
"The Eastern Cong's Phony Rebellion," The Reporter, March 11, 1965,
pp. 35-36.
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The Fall of Khrushchev
Khrushchev was removed as First Secretary and Prime Minister
on October li by the CPSUI Central Committee, as a result of a
conspiracy carried through against him by his designated successors,
Brezhnev and Kosygin. That he did not "resign," as the official
announcement indicated, because of age and ill-health is certain;
the probable cause of his fall must be deduced from what material
is available.
The primary causes for Khnishchevvs fall, in my view, were
internal and bureaucratic in character: the crisis in the Soviet
economy and agriculture, and his apparent determination to attempt
to surmount them and to increase his personal power by going over
the heads of the Presidium and the Central Committee to acquire
support from 6lite public opinion. 11 Foreign policy issues prob-
ably played some role in Khrushchev~s fall, although, in my view,
not a decisive and probably not even a major one. Press reports
from Moscow indicated115 that Khrushchevis intention to attempt a
114 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Victory of the Clerks," The New
Republic, CLI, 20 (November 14, 1964), pp9 5-18; Robert Conquest,
Russia After Khrushchev (New York and London: Praeger, 1965),
pp. 109-123; Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR (New York
and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 208-214; and
Richard Lowenthal, "The Revolution Withers Away_," Problems of
Communism, XIV, 1 (January-February 1965), pp. 10-6
115 See the obviously inspired press agency dispatches from
Moscow in The Times (London), Le Monde, and the Neue Zurcher Zeitung,
October 31, 176 The most detailed account of the "129 points" was
in a Moscow dispatch in Paese Sera (Rome), October 30, 196L; as to
their doubtful authenticity, see a denial, Pancaldi from Moscow in
L'Unith, October 30 and 31, 1964. (JPRS 27,590, November 30, 1964.)
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rapprochement with Bonn was probably one of the more important ones;
at any rate, it was the position his successors most rapidly and
completely reversed. Khrushchevvs failure either to force the
Chinese to retreat or to mobilize effective collective action
against them was, as has been shown above, sufficiently clear to
have made this an obvious charge against him, and press reports
indicate it may well have been so used. Nevertheless all available
evidence and the course of Sino-Soviet relations thereafter indicate
that Khrushchevvs successors at most objected to some of his tactics
against Peking, but shared with him a refusal to agree to the total
Soviet capitulation that Peking demanded.
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IV
After Khrishchev:
The Soviet Attempt at Rapprochement with Peking
Soviet and Chinese Strategy
1. The Strategy of the Post Khrushchev Leadership
The overthrow or death of a dictator is usually followed by a
struggle for power; and even though there are as yet few clear signs
of such a struggle among Khrushchev's successors, it is probably
under way. At any rate, the current Soviet leaders not only have
been preoccupied with the serious domesti.c economic and agricul-
tural situation but also, like any collective leadership, are less
capable than a dictator of pursuing a clear-cut, decisive course.
Consequently, and since Moscowts relations with Washington were
at the time of Khrushchev's ouster still relatively smooth, the
Soviets tried at once for a partial detente in the Sino-Soviet
crisis,
Yet their maximum objective can hardly have been anything like
a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Peking had. demanded total capitula-
tion from Khrushchev. Khrushchev had falen. However, the new
Soviet leaders were anxious to gain domestic popularity, which they
could get only by further liberalization at home and detente abroad:,
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exactly the opposite of the Chinese demands. The Central Committee
resolution announcing Khrushchev's "resignation" had reaffirmed the
validity of the Twentieth and Twenty-Second CPSU Congresses, thus
automatically cutting off any possibility of total agreement with
Peking. Furthermore, with Khrushchev gone, Mao aware of the lack
of authority of his successors, and Peking having exploded its
first atomic device, the new leaders could hardly expect that the
Chinese would soften their attitude toward the Soviets.
What the new Moscow leadership wanted from the Chinese was
much less: cessation of polemics, detente in Sino-Soviet relations,
the containment if not decline of Sino-Soviet competition through-
out the world, cooperation on such foreign policy issues as Vietnam:
an agreement to disagree and a pragmatic armistice. To obtain
these ends, the new Soviet leaders appeared ready to resume
extensive economic and technical assistance to China, and, unlike
Khrushchev, probably to postpone indefinitely the scheduled inter-
national Communist conference. The reaction of Khrushchev's
removal of hitherto pro-Soviet parties, with the exception of the
French and Bulgarian, had been far from satisfactory from the
Soviet viewpoint. Even the East Germans and the Czechs, as well
as the Poles, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, and Italians had expressed
praise for Khrushchev's merits, thus going contrary to Moscow's
indirect criticism of him, and only after they had sent delegations
to Moscow for "explanations" did they, with the exception of the
Italians, endorse Khrushchev's replacement. The Italians defiantly
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reasserted. their criticism, including criticism of Soviet internal
policies. The Austrian CP, although with more reserve, did the
same.o The Romanians, on the other hand, gave only minimal notice
to the fall of their hated. enemy. Soviet authority and influ-
ence had clear.y been dealt another blow, one which did not escape
notice by the Chineseo
2. Post -Khrushchev Chinese aims were, however, just the op-
posite. The fall of their chief opponent, which they had long
demanded and predicted, had finally occurred; and on that same day
they had exploded their first atomic d.evice in spite of Moscow s
having cut off all atomic, military, and economic aid. Chinese
influence had been steadily rising, and Soviet influence steadily
declining; was this trend now not likely to accelerate still fur-
ther? Finally, all this had, been accompanied by, and in large
116. Marchais and Waldeck-Rochet In LIHumanite, November 9,
1964 (JPRS 27, 590, November 30, 1964); Neues Deutschland, October
18, 1964; Rude Pravo, October 20, 1964 and Frankel from Prague in
The New York Times, November 1, 1964; Tbuna Ludu, October 29,
1964 and Frankel from Warsaw, The New York Times, November 8, 1964;
Nepszabadsig, October 25, 1964; L'Espresso, November 15, 1964;
interview with Berlinguer, Der Spieel THamburg), November 11,
1964, statement by Beriinguer upon his return from Moscow, ibid.,
November 4, 1964, and his press conference, Avantii, November ,
1964, all in JPRS 27, 590, November 30, 1964; Firneberg to the
Austrian CP CC, Volksstimme (Vienna), November 6, 1964 (JPRS 27,
590, November 30~,I6 ucharest dispatches /by Dessa Bourn~e
in The Times (London), November l and 16, 1964; for a round-up of
reactions, Salisbury in The New York Times, October 21, 1964.
117. CPR statement, October 16, 1964, In Jen-min Jih-pao,
October 17, 1964 and Peking Review, VII, 42 (October 16, 1964,
ppO ii-iii.
82
part, as Peking must have been convinced, caused by, the total re-
fusal of Peking to yieid an inch.
Having succeeded in delay-ing for some time the international
conference by such tactics, was it not now likely that if they con-
tinued on the same course, partaiv concealed by apparently
conciliatory moves, the conference would. be postponed still further
if not canceled, thus further increasing Chinese and decreasing
Soviet prestige? Moreover Peking also had to pay attention to
its allies,,. many of whom (the Japanese Communists, for example, as
well as the Albanians) had exposed themsel ves greatly vis-a-vis the
Soviets. Any sign of Chinese concessions to the Soviets would have
imperiled Peking's support within the International Communist move-
ment and made it the more difficult to reactivate its alliances
when and if--and most likely when--Sino-SoviLet relations worsened
again. It would have been surprising if Mao had changed his tac-
tics after such a ,ictory; and, as It soon became clear, he did
not. I
Not that Peking wished to appear totally inflexible; it wanted
to improve, or at least not worsen, its relations with parties such
as the Romanians who were opposed to an international conference
for their own reasons and who wanted a decline in Sino-Soviet
hostility. (The signs of disquiet in East Europe over Iarushchev's
fall made this consideration even more attractive.) But, as the
previous period had demons trated., it was the Soviets, rather than
the Chinese, who felt compelled to move toward a formal international
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split in order to cut their losses. Peking could therefore safely
afford to return to its former tactic of suaviter in modo,
fortiter in re: to respond with formal politeness to any Soviet
)overtures, but to reassure its suppcrters and ensure the revival
$of Soviet hostility by making clear its substantive refusal to
make any concessions.
Chou En-l'ai in Moscow
Direct Soviet polemics against the Chinese ceased with
Lhrushchev's fall; and Peking also ceased explicit polemics against
the Soviets, Whether this was a unilateral Soviet initiative
reciprocated by the Chinese, or whether it was accompanied by some
formal exchange of letters between Moscow and Peking we do not know.
he former seems more likely. Moreover, the new Soviet leadership
hinted it might modify its attitude on the international conference
and on Soviet economic aid to China. Moscow invited a high-
level Chinese delegation to the November 7 October Revolution cele-
brations in Moscow, and Peking sent Chou En-lai, Ho Lung (another
Politburo member), and. among others K'ang Sheng and Wu Hsiu-ch'ian,
both participants in the July 1963 Sino-Soviet bilateral discussions.
That Moscow also invited a Yugoslav government and party delegation
but not an Albanian one was a clear sign that no decisive Soviet
118. ". o duty of wide cooperation in all spheres of
Sconomic . . . life . - . an international conference of all communist
arties my italics--W. E. G , in "Unshakeable Leninist General
Line of the CPSU," Pravda, October 17, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI,
40 (October 28, 1964), pp. 3, 6, at po 6.
concessions were In the offing. On the other hand, Albania began
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attacking Khrushchev's successors soon after he was removed., a
move which Peking may not have initiated but which it could., but
did not, prevent.
The celebrations demonstrated that Sino-Scviet substantive
differences remained as great as evrer- Brezhnev's November 6
speech amounted to a complete rejection of the Chinese views. He
emphasized. production of consumer goods over heavy industry; he
lifted restrictions on collective farmers' private plots; he reaf-
firmed the validity of the Twentieth CPSU Congress. He reiterated
the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence; he specifically endorsed,
the partial test ban treaty, the CPSU Program and, the "state of the
whole people"; and he listed Yugoslavia as a socialist country.
He appealed to the Chinese only to improve interstate relations and
to tolerate differences in methods of socialist construction, with
effectiveness being the test of correctness. (This was substantially
the June 15, 1964 Soviet position.) Brezhnev's most hostile state-
ment, from Peking's viewpoint, iust have been his declaration that
the time was "obviously ripe" for an international Communist con-
ference to serve "cohesion" and " ty.
119. Spiro Koleka in Zeri i Popullit, October 23, 1964; "The
Fall of Khrushchev Did Not Entail. the Disappearance of Khrushchevian
Revisionism," ibid.., November 1, 1964; "Let Us Raise High the Vic-
torious Banner of the Ideas of Great October," ibid.,, November 7,
1964.
120. Pravda, November 7, 1964, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 43
(November 1897964), ppe 3-9. The conference call was repeated in
The Soviet plan, then, was to improve Sino-Soviet state rela-
tions on a pragmatic basis. To this end the October Revolution
slogans were somewhat more anti-American, and there were some
earlier indications that Moscow might be willing to make minor
concessions to Chinese views about strategy toward the United
States.122
The Chinese response was substantively at least as negative
as before Khrushchev's fall Although Peking's October Revolution
323
anniversary message was cordaal, ~ and the Chinese reprinted some
Pravda editorials and Brezhnev's speech, P'eng Chen's October
"In the Vanguard of the Struggle for Communism and Peace," Pravda,
November 10, 1964. The first post-Khrushchev reaffirmation of
Soviet support for a conference of "all" Communist parties was much
more general and made no reference to timing. See "Soviet Progress
Reviewed on the Eve of the 47th October Revolution Anniversary,"
Kommunist, No. 15, October 19 64 (passed for the press, October 26,
1964), pp. 3-9 (JPRS 27, 466, November 20, 1964)>
121. Pravda, October 18, 1964. (They did not refer to the
partial test ban treaty or to internationa.l detente.)
122. E.g., the Soviet-Cuban communi"u of October 18 (ibid.,
October 19, 1964), which listed the anti-imperialist struggle before
the reinforcement of peace. (See Michel Tatu, "La politique
sovietique sans M. Khrouchtchev, IT. Vers une reprise de contact
avec la Chine?", Le Monde, November 4, 1964.) The same was true of
"Foreign Policy and the Contemporary World " Kommunist, No- 3, Feb-
ruary 1965 (passed for the press February 22, 1965), pp- 3-14, but
it also reaffirmed (in italics) a view Peking rejected, that "The
guestion of peace has been and remains the overriding issue of all
contemporary life."
123. Jen-min Jih-pao, November 7, 1964 (SCMP, November 12,
1964, pp. 27-28)
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Revolution speech and the November 7 Jen-min Jih-pao editorial re-
peated, firmly albeit politely, the major Chinese theses: revolu-
tionary violence, dictatorship of the proletariat (i.e. no "state
of the whole people"), "unanimity through consultation" (i.e.
Chinese factionalism), a violent anti-United States policy, 13
socialist states (i.e. not including Yugoslavia), modern revision-
ism as the "main danger," and the Chou yang thesis of the inevita-
bility of splits.124
Compared to this restatement, the reference to "temporary"
Sino-Soviet difficulties which could be "gradually dissolved" was
not so significant. Finally, the editorial declared that "Khrush-
chev revisionism" would be "spurned by the people . . . in the
past, . . . in the present . . . and in the future"--a clear warn-
ing to Brezhnev and Kosygin 125 Moreover even before November 7
Albanian, West European, and Asian pro-Chinese parties and groups
were already denouncing Khrushchev's successors.126
Chou made his continued disapproval of Soviet policies publicly
clear in Moscow. When Brezhnev welcomed the Yugoslav delegation,
he alone did not applaud,127 and he laid a wreath on Stalin's tomb
124. For the above, see j. c. k. [Joseph CO Kun7, "The Pros
and Cons of Reconciliation," RFE/Munich, November 9, 1964.
125. Jen-min Jih-pao, November 7, 1964, quoted from Peking
Review, VII, 46 (November 13, 1964), pp. 14-17.
126. See Kevin Devlin, "Pro-Chinese Factions Intensify
Struggles," RFE/Munich, November 19, 1964.
127. Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbian, November 6, 1964,
1830 GMT.
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as he had in 1961. On November 13 there was a formal meeting
between the Soviets and Chinese, to which the Soviet communique
referred as "frank" and "comradely" but to which the Peking com-
munique did not deign to apply any adjective at al1928  Chou
later said129 that he had unsuccessfully tried to get the Soviets
to abandon the conference project, but he had. succeeded only in
getting it postponedcl30
On November 13 the rising Chinese hostility was simultaneously
evidenced by the publication, allegedly postponed since mid-October,
of a long Albanian attack on the Italian Communist Party. It was
mainly devoted to outlining and rejoicing over the differences be-
tween the Soviet and the Italian "revisionists." More significant
for Sino-Soviet relations was its flat statement that "the present
Soviet leadership , . resolutely pursues the revisionist line of
the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU Congresses" and its call for "defend-
ing, helping . and. suapporting unreservedly
new parties and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups"--i.e. the
intensification of pro-Chinese factional activity .131
128. Pravda, November 14, 1964; Peking Review, Vii, 47
(November 20, 1964), pp, 5-6 (SCMP 3393, Ncvember 18, 1964, p. 39).
129. In an interview with K. S. Karol in Peking in late
March 1965 (The New Statesman, March 26, 1965)Y,
130. Tanner from Moscow in The New York Times, November 11,
1964.
131. "The Testament of P. Togliatti, the Crisis of Modern
Revisionism, and the Struggle of Marxists-Leninists," Z6ri i
Popullit, November 13, 1963.
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On November 21, with the publication of an exultant and defiant
Hung Ch'i editorial, "Why Khrushchev Fell," the Chinese position
was once again in the open. Peking maintained that Khrushchev's
fall, which was inevitable because of his "revisionist general
line," had been long foreseen. In twelve points the editorial
summed up and rejected the totality of Soviet foreign and domestic
policies and all of the Soviet moves against Peking. The article
concluded with a barely veiled warning to the new Soviet leaders:
. 0 . the course of history will continue to be
tortuous. Although Khrushchev has fallen, his
supporters-the U.S. imperialists, the reaction-
aries and the modern revisionists--will not resign
themselves to this failure. These hobgoblins are
continuing to pray for Khrushchev and are trying
to "resurrect" him with their incantations, vocifer-
ously proclaiming his "contributions" and "meri-
torious deeds" in the hope that events will develop
along the lines prescribed by Khrushchev, so that
"Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" may prevail.
It can be asserted categorically that theirs is a
blind alley.
Different ideological trends and their
representatives invariably strive to take the stage
and perform. It is entirely up to them to decide
which direction they will take. . . .132
This defiant Chinese article may well have encouraged. the new
Soviet leadership to dispatch a circular letter on November 24,
1964 summoning the postponed drafting committee meeting for March
1, 1965. China and her allies immediately again refused to
132. "Why Khrushchev Fell,," Hung Ch'i, Nos. 21/22, November
21, 1964, quoted from Peking Review, VII, .8 (November 27, 1964),
pp. 6-9. The reference to "contributions" refers to East European
Communist leaders' statements about Khrushchev, but it implied that
the new Soviet leadership took the same view. U
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attend. 13 3 Although conciliatory in form, It in fact marked the
Soviet decision to resume--under far less favorable conditions--
its "collective mobilization" against the Chineseol34
Simultaneously Jen-min Jih-pao began reprinting comments on
Karushchev's fall by prc-Soviet and. pro-Chinese parties, among
them a violent November 1 Albanian editorial entitled "Khrushchev's
Fall Did Not Entail the Disappearance of Khrushchevian Revisionismn135
and a declaration by PKI leader Aidit that Khrushchev's removal
was not "the end of the struggle to smash modern revisionism" and
that Moscow should. amend the Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-
Second Congress resolutions.l36
In January 1965 Mao told Edgar Snow that there was "possibly
some but not much . . . improvement in Sino-Soviet relationso"1 37
Then by late January Peking was reprinting much more bitter anti-
133. See, eog., the December 1 PK1 refusal in ibid.,, VII,
52 (December 25, 1964), pp. 17-18.
134. Pravda, December 12, 1964, quoted from Peking Review,
VIII, 13 (March 26, 1965), pp, 21-22. The letter also contained
the information that China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania
had previously refused to participate in any international meeting,
that the Japanese and Indonesian parties had. "requested further
information" (and, in fact, did not participate); and Romania re-
fused to participate unless all others did--ice. in fact refused.
See also the implicitly anti=Chinese "The State of the Whole
People," Pravda, December 6, 1964.
135. Zeri i Popuillit, November 1, 1964. See also j. c k.
[Joseph C,0 Kun, "Khrushchev's Fall--As Seen From Peking," RFE/Munich, November 21, 1964&
-6. Peking Reiw VII4 &8 (Ncvember 27, 1964), pp. 18-19.
137. The Ne-w Republic, CLII, 9 (February 27, 1965), PP- 17-
23, at p. 21.
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Soviet articles, for example, a Japanese Communist attack denounc-
ing the new Soviet leadership for "disruptive activities" within
the Japanese party and an Albanian one specifically calling for
the end of the truce in explicit Sino-Soviet polemics, which, al-
legedly, "the present revisionist Soviet leadership" were only
using to "restore all the links and agreements maintained by
Khrushchev with the imperialists. "l39 Peking also renewed its
attacks on India and publicized extensively the first congress
of the pro-Chinese Indian Communist Party.1,41
Moreover (as Tirana made public in early February), at the
beginning of January Poland, presumably on Moscow's behalf, had
invited Albania to the January 19-20 Warsaw meeting of the Warsaw
Pact Political. Consultative Committee. The Albanian reply was a
long violent demand for a total and, humiliating Soviet capitulation
as the price of its attendance, by far the most extreme Albanian
demand ever made on Moscow. 'Not only did the Albanians demand that
the Soviets publicly renounce their Albanian policy and make eco-
nomic and military reparations to Tirana, but they also insisted on
138. "On a Series of New Attacks on our Party by Prokharov
and Others," Akahata, December 28, 1964, reprinted in Jen-min Jih-
pao, January 20, 1964.
139. "Revolutionary Marxism Will Triumph in Europe," Z'bri i
Popullit, January 6, 1965, reprinted in Jen-min Jih-pao, January
21, 1965.
140. "Another Glaring Exposure of the Indian Government 's Re-
actionary Features," ibid,. January 17, 1965, and Peking Review,
VIII, 4 (January 22, 96), pp. 5-6.
141. Thid., pp. 17-18.
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the end of Soviet military aid to Yugoslavia and Ind-ia, the irmmedi-
ate signature of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, the
immediate denunciation of the partial nuclear test ban treaty by
Moscow and all other Warsaw Pact members, and a collective commit-
ment to see that all. socalist coutries received. nuclear weapons
(presumably given by Mosccw) "as a cunter-measure" if West
Germany is admitted to the MLF or otherwise gets nuclear arms. One
wonders if all this was Chinese-inspred; perhaps the Albanians
were trying to over-commit Peking. Yet this was the second. time
Moscow had, reluctantly made an overture to the Albanians, and the
second time Tirana had violently rejected it 143
As in many other areas, the new Soviet leadership initially
gave some Lndications in its policies toward. underdeveloped areas
that it might abandor Khrushchevs intuensified rapprochement with
radical nationalists for a more orthodox pcsItion. However, the
inexorable dynamic of competition with the Chinese., plus the
142. Zeri i Popullit , February 2, 1965, which included the
texts of a January n, 9 rote from Warsaw to Tirana, a January
15 Tirana reply, including a long letter to the Warsaw, Pact meet-
ing, a Warsaw Pact Polltical Consultative Committee decision of
January 20,, and a final brieL Albanian note to the Warsaw Pact of
January 29. (This may well, like other Albanilan moves, have been
somewhat more extreme than Peking desired, but the Chinese have
never d"i avowed Tirana, and the degree of Albanian deviation from
Peking, i± any, remains in question-)
143. For the March 1963 incident, see Griffith, The Sino-
Soviet Rift, pp 1.17-18.
144. Ra anan, op. cit. the return of "national democracy" in
the May Day slogans (Pravd.a, April 2,, 1965), and in Pieter
Keuneman, "New Features of 'the National Liberation Movement," World
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similarly heterodox position of such right-wing parties as the PCI,
appeared in mid-1965 to be pushing Moscow back toward something
like Khrushchev's courting of such "revolutionary democrats" as Ben
Bella and Nasser.145 Indeed, some signs indicated that Moscow
might even be contemplating going farther than Khrushchev and con-
sidering such a radical move as abandoning entirely Communist
parties in such areas as North Africa for alliance with the FLN
and Nasser, in the hope (like Stalin with the Kuomintang) that
Arab Communists could more effectively infiltrate and influence
146
from within than languish in jail and impotence.
Finally, in January and. February Peking praised Sukarno's
denunciations of the United. Nations, and his withdrawal from it,
and gave its approval, albeit guardedly and without a firm commitment
Marxist Review, VII, 12 (December 1964), pp. 3-9; the anti-Nasser
article by Khaled Bagdash, "Syria s New Road,," ibid., VIII, 3 (March
1965), pp. 7-14- Radio Moscow, Leninist University of the Millions
broadcasts, March 16, 18, 25, 30 and April 1, 6, 1965. I am most
grateful to Dr. Ra'anan for enlightening discussions on this sub-
ject.
145. Eogo,, G. Mirsky (of the Institute), "On Noncapitalist
Path of Development of Former Colonies," Pravda, January 31,
1963; Berlinguer at the March 1965 18-party meeting, cited in
note 179 infra.
146. Notably the communique on a meeting of Arab Communists,
Pravda, December 11, 1964, and a so far unpublished paper on this
subject by Professor Richard Lowenthal, delivered before the
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung in Bad
Godesberg, December 1964. For the absorption of the "former"
Algerian CP into the FLN, see Bashir Hadj Ali, "Some Lessons of
the Liberation Struggle in Algeria," World Marxist Review,
VIII, 1 (January 1965), pp. 50-57.
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to support it, to the Indonesian President s proposal to form a
new and "revolutionary" United Nations.147 The Chinese probably
envisage, once they can extract it from Soviet control, the eventu-
al transformation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization into
such a "revolutionary" United NatiLons; but they are too shrewd
to risk their support in underdeveloped areas by trying to persuade
them all to ithdraw from tihe only organizatIon where their votes
are nct overshadowed by their lack of political and military
148
power. But that Peking was committed to paralyziLng the United
Nations, even f it dlid not hope that it could. soon destroy it,
became clear in mid-February when the Alban:an General Assembly
delegate almost st:ceeded in forcing a vote on the Article 19
issue and thus wrecking the effcrts for a Soviet-American compro-
mise on it. Although, Moscow and. Washington eventually succeeded
in foiling this plan,. several African states demonstrated their
opposition to great power domi4nation by endorsing or abstaining on
the voie. l
1h7. See Chou En-lai's January 24, 1965 speech and Chen Yi's
January 26 one in PekingReview, VIII., 5 (January 29, 1965), pp
5-7, a Chinese-Indonsian communiqu6 of January 28, 1965, and
"New Page in Sinc-Indcnesian Corrradeship-in-Arms Jen-min Jih-pao,
January 30, 1965, in ibid., pp. 5-9.
148. For Afro-Asian reluctance to leave the UN, see Radio
Algiers, January 25, 1965, and Radio Accra, January 26, 1965,
149. Hamilton from the UN in The New York Times, February
17-19, 1965; Zsri i Popullit, February 1.7-20, 195
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V
The Vietnam Crisis and After
On February 7 Soviet Premier Kosygin and a Soviet delegation,
including several high-ranking military officials, arrived in Hanoi.
Kosygin had stopped over in Peking on February 6, where he was
correctly but cooly received by Chou-En-lai. On that same day
American bombers carriled out the first of a series of raids on
North Vietnam. Since then Sino-Soviet relations have been in-
creasingly influenced, by the Vietnam crisis. With the brief and
partial exception of the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, this
was the first time since the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis that the ac-
tion of a major non-Communist power--in all three instances, the
United States--exercised major influence on Sino-Soviet relations.
150
(As in the case of the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu and the 1962
151 1Cuban crises, Sino-Soviet relations had been worsening again,
after a temporary improvement, before American action influenced
them significantly, but also, as in the two previous instances,
this worsening was considerably accelerated by Washington's posi-
tion.) Before turning to the March 1964 Mosc w 18-party confer-
ence, therefore, we must pause tc analyze the significance of this
new external factor.
1. The Vietnam issue. For some years Viet Cong guerrilla
activity had been increasing in South Vietnam, and the Saigon
150. See Zagoria, The Sino-Scviet Conflict, p 200224.
151. See Griffith, lhe SincSoviet Rift, pp, 60-63-
government's control of the ccuntry weaken.ingo The Viet Cong's
political. organizaticn, the Nati.onal Liberation Front (NLF), sub-
stantially and increasing1y under Hanoi control,, became increas-
ingly confident, a did. Hanci (itself increasingly pro-Chinese) and
Peking that Washington would evenualy withdraw from Saigon. Con-
comitantly,, United States support of South Vietnam had. increasedI
After the overt hrow of Diem, Viet Cong victories, and a series of
coups dietat in Saigon President Johnson decided that direct American
military interven.icn was necessary to prevenrt a neutralist coup in
Saigon and to redress the mil1tary balance s, that negotiations with
Hanoi might not result in itc a sorption of the South and, more
generally, to contain ChineE expansionism and to demonstrate that
"national liberation war" could no defeat AmeRican power. The
American d.ecision to ecalae was apparently taken around the turn
of the year; and. a Vie C ng att-ack on an American installation at
Pleiku, and perhaps Ksygn i to Hanodi as ell provided a
152
convenient opport-unity to begin I.ti
2. Sov ie policyn stan, American escalation in Vietnam
presented. an unavoidabl but excee.dingly er.mbarrasing problem for
Moscow, the more sc after the scaaton. Kbrushchev had come
152. For the role cf Ranoi in the Sino-Scriet dispute, see
P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vi'etnam (Cariridge, Mass The
MeGTi Press,9 riff T5he S7,no-Soviet Rift, pp. 128-130,
192-194; for the Viet Cong and the NLF, Douglas Pike, Viet ConE
(Cambridge, Mass.-: The ML.To Press, 1965). For general views
of Vietnam and American policy with respect to it, see Honey., "The
New Phase of the War " China New _Anal ysis (Hong Kong), No. 568
(North Vietnam Quarterly Surve, No , June 11, 1965; Zbigniew
Brzezinski, "Peace, oraity and Vietnam" The New Leader, XVII,
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close to disengaging the Soviet Union from Vietnam and Laos; how-
ever, Kosygin's visit to Hanoi. was a sign that the new Soviet
leadership was attempting to reestablish some Soviet influence in
Hanoi. Given its decision to postpone but eventually to summon the
international Communist conference Moscow wanted. Hanoi's neutrality
if not support for this move. More importantly, even before the
American escalat on, and the more so thereafter, the deepening
crisis in Saigon confronted the Soviets with great dangers and con-
siderable opportunities. As long as Moscow could not completely
control Hanoi--the Soviets had no reason to think that this had been
or soon would be the case; indeed, since May 1963 Hanoi had been
pro-Peking-the overding Soviet interest in Vietnam remained the
avoidance of a major confrontation with Washington over an area
which it could not cont;rol and whose victories would benefit Peking
more thar Moscow. Specifi ally, if, as in late 1964 it seemed
likely to American as well as to Soviet observers, Washington would
(as Hanoi and Peking expected) evenitual ly withdraw rather than
escalate, Moscow could not afford to have been inactive during such
a major Chinese victory and American defeat. On the contrary, the
Soviets had to participate in the vict ory so as to limit China's
gains from it. After America escalated., Moscow was more able than
Peking to offer Hanoi mcdern antiaircraft defenses to limit the
8 (April 12, 1965), pp. 5-6,; Griffith, "Containing Communism--East
and West," The Atlantic Monthhl, 215, 5 (May 1965), pp. 71-75;
George Mc. Kahin and John W. Lewis, "The United States in Vietnam,"
Bulletin of the Atomi c Scientits, XX, 6 (June 1965), pp. 28-40.
Hans Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam, " The New
York Times Magazine, May 9, 1965; Alexander Dallin, "Moscow and
Vietnam," Th New Leader XLVII, 10 (May 10, j965), pp. 5-8.
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bombing, and Hanoi therefore by February 1965 was actually more
dependent on Moscow than before and therefore more amenable to
Soviet influence. Finally, given the continuing if temporarily
latent Sino-Soviet hostility and Soviet determination to cut its
losses within the international Communist movement, Moscow could
not afford to give to other Communist parties the impression that
it would entirely sacrifice its "proletarian international" obli-
gations to Hanoi to its overriding interest in avoiding a confronta-
tion with the strategically superior United States; to do so would
be playing into Peking2 s hands. Even before the American escala-
tion the new Soviet leadership's move toward a rapprochement with
Hanoi stemmed at least in part from Moscow's desire to establish
some measure of Soviet control over a situation which potentially
threatened to drag the Soviet Union nolens volens into a confronta-
tion with Washington. On the international level the Soviets wanted
to prevent or limit American escalation by negotiations, which, they
hoped, would lead first to neutralization and then to the absorption
of South Vietnam by a Hanoi no longer under predominant Chinese in-
fluenceo After the escalation the Soviets were in a much worse
dilemma: they had both more reason and more opportunity to try to
recover control over Hanoi, but their fear of a confrontation with
Washington precluded them giving Hanoi the military assistance which
alone would have made their recovery of control possible.
3. Chinese policy on Vietnam Peking's objectives in Viet-
nam were quite different from Moscow's. True, both shared a desire
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to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States;
154153 154indeed Mao himself and his associates have consistently been
careful to make clear that they will not attack the United States
unless Washington first attacks them. Nevertheless, as the
course of the Sino-Soviet dispute has made clear, there was a basic
difference between the Soviet and the Chinese assessment of American
policy when confronted with a "national liberation struggle." Mao
was convinced., contrary to Soviet leaders, that protracted guer-
rilla struggle would make American escalation unlikely, and., if
and when it occurred., both limited and unsuccessful. (Even so, the
American escalation seriously questioned the original Chinese thesis
that America is a paper tiger. i.e. will not escalate, and tended
to support the contrary Soviet view.) Specifically, Mao now pre-
fers more rather than less American intervention in Vietnam as long
as the United States does not defeat the Viet Cong or attack China
itself, and as long as Hanoi remains recalcitrant: the resultant
protracted U.S.-Viet Cong struggle would draw Hanoi closer to
Peking, would raise Chinese prestige both within and outside of the
Communist movement, would. further justify an extremist domestic
policy in China, and, finally, would force Moscow to abandon its
priority for detente with Washington for a more militant posture
153. In an interview with Edgar Snow in Peking in January
1965, The New Republic, CLII, 9 (February 27, 1965), pp. 17-23, at
p. 22.
154. Lo Jui-ching, "Commemorate the Victory Over German
Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to
the End.," Peking Review, VIII, 20 (May 14, 1965), pp. 7-14.
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that could only justify Chinese policy and further China's security
interests.
4. Hanoi's policynVetm 5 Ho Chi Minh combines guer-
rilla communism with Vietnamese nationalism, anti-colonialism, and
determination to reunify Vietnam. He had, defeated, the French; the
Viet Cong seemed well on the way to victory; why should he retreat,I
despite American escalation? He did, need and wanted more Soviet
support, and he had never wanted a Sino-Soviet split; rather, his
own security interests demanded joint Sino-Soviet support for Hanoi
against Washington. Therefcre, at least unless American escalation
were to wreak major damage in North Vietnam or American ground
forces were to defeat the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, or both, he,
like Mao, wanted to continue the war . The same was even more true
for the National Liberation Front, to whom victory must have seemed
within reach, and who had no desire to return, as they had in 1954,
to the North to wait for a )etter d.ayI
155. For the most extreme (and pro-Chinese) Hanoi position,
see Truong Chinh, "Let Us Raise High the Creative Marxist -Leninist
Banner and Hold Fast to the Party's Military Line," Quan Doi Nhan
Dan (Hanoi), February 4, 1965. Although Hanoi's position has been
moderately and conditionally pro-Chinese since May 1963 (see Grif-
fith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 128-1.30, 1,92-193), a December 1963
Lao Dong CC communiqu.i (Nhan Dan, January 21, 1964, Jen-min Jih-pao,
January 23, 1964) carefully distinguished between "the Tito revi-
sionist clique, a lackey of imperialismi" and " - . . mistaken
people within the international Communist movement . . - who commit
the error of revisionism or right-wing opportunism E e. the
Sovietsj The former are to be exposed and opposed, the latter
struggled with "for the sake of unity." Cfo j. c. k. Eoseph C.
Kun , "North Vietnamese Still on the Fence," RFE/Munich, January
27, 1964.
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The Kosygin Visit, American Escalation, and
Sino-Soviet Relations
As might have been expected, the Kosygin visit to Peking and
Hanoi and the simultaneous initiation of American bombing raids on
North Vietnam worsened Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American relations.
The February 10 Soviet-North Vietnamese communique, cordial in
tone, included a Soviet commitment to "strengthen the defense
capacity of the DRV,"156 and shortly thereafter construction began
around Hanoi for Soviet ground-to-air antiaircraft missiles. 1 5 7
However, the February 8 Soviet and Chinese governmental decla-
rations on the American bombingl58 differed, and these differences
intensified thereafter. Both of course condemned it strongly; but
156. Pravda, February 11, 1965, quoted from CDSP, XVII, 6
(March 3, 1965)7,pp. 9-11, at p. 9. Kosygin also visited Pyongyang,
where he seems to have had more success: North. Korea as of this
writing had practically ceased polemics with Moscow. For the visit,
see Pravda, February 13-16, 1965; and for subsequent indications,
Demichev in ibid., April 23, 1965 and Kim Il-song in Indonesia,
April 14, in KCNA, April 19, 1965, both cited from j. c. k.
&roseph C. Kun, "North Koreas Back in the Middle?", RFE/Munich,
May 7, 1965, q. v.
157. UPI dispatch from Saigon in The New York Times, February
17, 1965.
158. Texts: ibid., February 9, 1965.
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while Moscow, with careful imprecision, spoke only of being
forced., together with its allies and friends, to
take further measures to safeguard. the security
and strengthen the defense capability of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam I
Peking declared that:
all the other Socialist countries have the unshirk-
able international ob.igation to support and assist
it with actual deeds. I
Furthermore PekiLng's attack on the United States was considerably
more violent than Moscow's.
That the Peking Kosygin-Chou conversations did not stem the
worsening of Moscow-Peking relations in spite, apparently, of
Kosygin having renewed the previous Soviet offers to expand eco-
nomic and technical cooperation, 5 9 soon became clear. Although
the mid-February Soviet and Chinese messages on the occasion of the
fifteenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance were cordial in
tone, their substantive differences were even clearer than in the
February 8 statements, part icularl1y with respect to the United
160
States. Shortly thereafter Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal
Chen Yi declared that peacefuI coexistence with the United States
is "impossible" and. that:I
159. See Kosygin's speech after his HanoJi trip, Pravda, Feb-
ruary 27, 1965 (CDSP, KVII, 9 Varch 24, 196", pp. 3-6); Borba,
February 21, 1,965.
160, Pravda and Jen-min Jih-pao, February 14, 1965.
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. . . only in concrete action against United States
imperialism and its followers can the Sino-Soviet
alliance be tested and tempered. and Sino-Soviet
unity be consolidated and developed. . . .
He also demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam as
a precondition for peace there. Kosygin, on the other hand,
while he also demanded U.S. withdrawal, referred to this problem
only as an "obstacle.1 62
By the end of February reports indicated that Moscow had told
Paris that it would support General de Gaulle's plan for a negoti-
ated settlement in South Vietnam.163 Peking and Hanoi, on the
other hand, rejected negotiations.164 In addition, just before the
March 1 opening date of the preparatory committee for an interna-
tional conference, the Chinese declared that Moscow was supporting
ta vicious scheme of the United States to promote neo-colonialism"--
the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force.165 In
another sign of the new storm to come, Peking began to accuse Mos-
cow of resuming polemics. 66
161. Ibid. , February 16 and 19 , 1965, and Peking Review, VIII,
8 (February 19, 1965), p. 12, VIII, 9 (February 26, 1965), p. 4.
162. Pravda, February 17, 1965.
163. Paris dispatch in The Times (London), February 25, 1965;
Henri Pierre from Moscow in Le Monde, February 26, 1965-
164. Andre Fontaine in ibid. , February 27, 1965; Jen-min Jih-
pao, February 19, 1965.
165. Ibid., February 25, 196, (SCMP 34,07, March 2, 1965.)
166. Jen-min Jih-pao, February 26 , 1965, et seq
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The March 1965 Moscow 18-Party Meeting
Developments from k1irushchev's fall until the March . 18-party
meeting confirmed the accelerating decline= of Soviet influence.
Both the membership and the character of the meeting became less
favorable from the Soviet viewpoint. Romania refused to come at
all. Cuba's attendance became certain only shortly before the
meeting; and although this indicated. that Soviet-Cuban relations
had improved, a communique of a late 1964 meeting of Latin American
Communist parties in Havana16 7 indicated that Moscow had made some
concessions to Castro concerning revitalization of violent struggle
in Latin America and that Cuba continued to oppose any Sino-Soviet
splitol 6 8  The British Communist Party almost did not attend the
167. Pravda. January 19, 196,5 The communique took pro-Soviet
and implicitly anti-Chinese positions on the international confer-
ence issue, cessation of polemics, etc, It was, however, more
favorable than the Mosco-oriented Latin American CP's previously
had been to the Fidelista ad.rocacy of armed struggle. See A.
Ferrari, J. M. Fortung, P. Matta Lima, L, Ferreto, "The Cuban Revo-
lution and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Latin American
Peoples,," World Marxist Review, VII, 1 (January 1965), pp. 29-35.
Yet Fidelista-pro-Soviet CP tension still exists in Latin America;
see, eog., the anti-guerrilla article by the Argentinian Ernesto
Judisi, "The Revolutionary Process in Latin America," ibid.,, VIII,
2 (February 1965), pp. 15-22.
168. See the March 13 Castro speech, reprinted by Pravda on
March 18, which by implication criticized Soviet lack of aid to
Hanoi but which contained sharp if -implied criticism of Peking for
its "splittism" and its spreading of Chinese propaganda in Cuba.
Cf. Fritz Ermarth, "Fidel, the Giant Killer," RFE/Munich, March 20,1965.
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meeting at all (its one representative arrived a day late) and
made clear its opposition to the meeting itself and its refusal to
cooperate in the originally specified purposes.170
However, the position of the Italian Communist Party was per-
haps most important in changing the character of the meeting. After
Khrushchev's fall the PCI intensified its attempts to .influence
other parties to support its views concerning the international con-
ference and otherwise, particularly the Vietnam crisis and policy
toward underdeveloped. areas, Its main right-wing leader, Giorgio
Amendola, made a major new proposal: the formation of a unified
working class party which would be based "neither on social demo-
cratic nor on communist pc itions," just as radical national libera-
tion movements were not, and. which would encourage "the most advanced
currents of modern thought," not only those of Marx, Lenin, Labri-
ola and Gramsci but also "other philosophical and cultural posi-
tions." Amendola implicitly advocated the end of democratic
centralism and the allowing of factions:
169. Pravd a, March 2, 1965.
170. Daily Worker (London), January 11, 1965; excerpts:
Peking Review, VIII., 4 (January 22, 1965), pp. 19-20; The Sunday
Times (London), February 28, 1965
171. Mario Alicata, "Il dialogo del PCI con i partiti
fratelli," Rinascita, XXI, 40 (October 10, 1964), pp. 5-6; Enrico
Berlinguer s rejection of PCF leader Leroy's criticism of the
Togliatti testament, especially re the conference, L'Unita, Octo-
ber 24, 1964 and Rinascita, XXI, 42 (October 24, 1964), pp. 7-8
(JPRS 27, 299, November 10, 1964); and three RFE/Munich analyses,
j,, c . k. Joseph C. Kun, "Italian Party Delegation to Hanoi,"
April 11, 1965, William McLaughlin, "French Left Looks at Italian
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. 0 . one cannot pretend to create a unitary party
on the ideological positions occupied by the com-
munist avant-garde. The communists will continue,
naturally, their Marxist struggle within the
unitary party, in a permanent, democratic debate
of ideas. . . .
True, this meant communist "infiltration from within"; but perhaps
as important was his justification for his proposals: communism,
like social democracy, had failed to realize a "socialist trans-
formation of society.1"1 7 2 Amendola's proposals were not endorsed
by his associates, but the PCI rejected'7 3 Soviet criticism of
them.174 In mid-February the PCI made clear that it would attend
only if the meeting were consultative in character 1 7 5  Thereupon
Moscow, which before had referred to it as the "first session of
the editorial commission,"l76 (ie. identifying it with the
Communism," May 13, 1965, and Kevin Devlin, "The PCI's Ideological
Diplomacy," May 18, 1965
172. Giorgio Amendola, "Ipotesi sulla riunificazione,"
Rinascita, XXI, 47 (November 28, 1964), pp0 8-9.
1734 go c p0 Ellian Carlo Pajettaj, "Pubblicita del
dibattito," ibid.,, XXII, 5 (January 30, 1965), p0 13-
174. "Italian Communist Party Discusses the Creation of a
Single Party of the Working Class," Kommunist, No0 ,l, January
1965, pp0 97-104 (JPRS 28, 914, February 26, 1965).
175. Berlinguer to- the PCI CC, L 'Unita, February 19, 1965
(JPRS 29, 136, March 16, 1965) and PCI CC resolution, ibid., Feb-
ruary 20, 1965 (JPRS 29, 215, March 22, 1965). The initial PCI
reaction to Moscow's December 1964 postponement of the meeting had
been noncommittal (Rinascita, XXI, 50 EDecember 19, 1964J, p. 2)>
176. Pravda, December 12, 1964,
1o6
preparatory meetings prior to the 1960 conference) was forced to
term it only a "consultative meeting."177 Thus the meeting was
emptied of all effectively anti-Chinese content before it ever
began.178
The "consultative meeting" of 18 parties met in Moscow from
March 1 to 5. The meetings were secret, and the only major pub-
lished documentation on its discussions available by mid-1965 was
the speech of the chief Italian Communist delegate, Enrico
179Berlinguer. When one compares it with the conference communique
(summarized below), one realizes clearly how great a victory the
PCI won at the conference, and how complete was the Soviet defeat.
Berlinguer stated frankly that the PCI s views at this meeting, on
which a "consultative character has been opportunely conferred, on
some points are different from those of other comrades. After
quoting and endorsing Togliatti's testament on the conference, in-
cluding the criticism of the slowness of democratization in
socialist countries, Ferlinguer rejected "the myth of an improvised
177. Ibid., February 28., 1965. For earlier indications of
Soviet retreat, see Francois Billoux, "Some Urgent Proglems of the
International Communist Movement," World Marxist Review, VIII, 1
(January 1965), pp. 9-14. The Japanese CP has stated that it was
"orally" informed on February 26 that the meeting would not be a
"drafting committee" but a "consultation." See Akahata, April 13,
1965, cited from William McLaughlin, "China's 'Vanguard'," RFE/
Munich, May 19, 1965.
178. Cf. in general C. Duevel, "March 1 Conference Over-
shadowed by Pending Ideological Blast from Peking," Radio Liberty/
Munich, March 2, 1965.
179. Enrico Berlinguer, "La posizione del PCI all' incontro
di Mosca," Rinascita, XXII, ll(March 13, 1965), pp. 3-5.
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and global solution" of Sino-Soviet differences in favor of "gradu-
al construction" of unity, which would include close contacts with
radical revolutionary movements in order, after the "liquidation of
outlived schemes and methods" among Communist parties, to create
"the basis of a world-wide unity of the whole revolutionary move-
mento" After carefully rejecting nationalist and regional. views
and declaring that the PCI had "no objection in principle" to in-
ternational meetings, he then made clear that the PCI refused to
accept Soviet objectives for such a meeting. The two-year attempt
to convene one, he said, "could. not be judged entirely positively."
It had divided. parties into "supporters and opponents of a con-
ference. "
The practical result of this was that
the conference, announced as imminent, did not
take place
because of the risk of a split. At the present conference "the
fundamental part of the revolutionary forces of an entire continent
such as Asia" are absent. He then flatly declared:-
0 0 Our viewpoint is summed up in the conviction
that it is proper to recognize that the conditions
for a new, useful international conference of all
the fraternal parties have not yet matured. . . I
Not, he went on, that the idea of such a conference should be
abandoned: it should remain a "perspective" but not the immediate
goal. However--and here the PCI veto became clear and. detailed: U
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. . . we are opposed, to putting in motion an organi-
zational mechanism before the necessary political
conditions have matured, one which would in any case
be contrary to the purely consultative character of
our meeting. We are absolutely in agreement with
those comradesl80 who have excluded any eventuality
in which this meeting could adopt decisions or
formulate propositions relative to the date of the
conference or the date of the other meetings which
may be prepared, as well as to the themes of dis-
cussion and its course. We are not in agreement
with the views of certain comradesldl that we should
consider the dates and places of the next meetings.
I add also, with all explicitness, that we are
totally opposed to any proposals which would tend to
give organizational continuity, in whatever form, to
this meeting. We can in no sense give the impression
of constituting an organizing committee for the con-
ference or for an eventual preparatory meeting of the
81 parties. . . .
Probably the British and Cuban , and to some extent the Pole s,
supported Berlinguer's views, while the Soviets, French, and the
three split parties (Australian, Brazilian, and Indian) favored a
stronger anti-Chinese stand, than actually emerged from it.
The meeting was a fiasco for Moscow. Its final communique
made clear that the parti1cipants had only "held consultations" and
"exchanged opinions"; and only once, in reaffirming the 1960 Decla-
ration in favor of international Communist conferences, was it
specifically stated that the participants "unanimously" agreed.
Its formulations on international politics reflected the hardening
Soviet line against the United States, but an accompanying state-
ment on Vietnam was couched in very general terms. "Unity of action
180. British? Cuban?--W. E. G.
181. French? Bulgarian? Soviet?--W. E. G.
in the struggle against imperialism" was advocated, "even given the
existence of disagreements concerning the political line and many
important problems in theory and tactics "--ie. it was tacitly ad-
mitted that Sino-Soviet disagreements would continue for a long
time. The passages concerning further "collective efforts" made
clear that the Italian view had prevailed over the Soviet; despite
his death months before Togliatti was the victor of the confer-
ence. Although the desiratility of an international conference
was "unanimously" affirmed. it was thereafter so qualified that in
fact it was indefinitely postponed. There was no date set for such
a conference; it was to meet "at a suitable timec" Not only must
it be "carried out with the observance of the principles of full
equality and the independence of each party," but also it must be
"thoroughly" prepared, Specifically it was to be prepared not by
a preparatory committee (a body which the meeting implicitly dis-
solved) but by a "preliminary consultative meeting" of all the 81
parties that met in Moscow in 1960. Consultations must be carried
out with "all" these parties in order to "solve the question" of
calling the preparatory meeting and "joint efforts should be
actively exerted to create favorable cond itions for participation
in its preparation by all the fraternal parties ." Not only, then,
the Italians but presumably also the Chinese could delay even the
8 1-party preparatory consultative meeting for a long time to come.
Finally, the communique, like Togliattias testament, called for the
end of open polemics, the continuation of a comradely "exchange of
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opinion," and the end of "the interference of some parties in the
internal affairs of others." 182
What was not in the communique was perhaps an even clearer
indication of the Soviet losses than what was. There was no men-
tion of collective mobilization or of a "firm rebuff" of the Chin-
ese, indeed no reference to the Chinese at all except the very
indirect one about "unfriendly and offensive" polemics; no mention
of dogmatism as "the main danger" (and no mention of the Yugo-
slavs); and no mention of majority decisions being binding. Indeed,
by the emphasis on independence and equality the communique implic-
itly reaffirmed the role of unanimity. Moreover the reactions of
various West European parties to the communique showed that the
meeting had reinforced their drift away from Moscow,183 and a sub-
sequent Pravda ed.itorial went even farther than the communique in
emphasizing the necessity for "new" ways and approaches to unity.18 4
182. "Communiqu' on the Consultative Meeting of Representatives
of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow," Pravda, Marcy 10,
1965, quoted from CDSP, XVI, 9 (March 24,, 1965), pp. 7-8; "State-
ment on Events in Vietnam by Participants in Consultative Meeting
of Communist ard Wcrkers" Parties," Pravda, March 4, 1965. See
Christian Duevel, "First Class Funeral for World Comm-unist Confer-
ence," Radio Liberty/Muntch, March 10, 1965; r. r. go R. Rocking-
ham Gillj, "Not With a 8ang, But a Whimper," RFE/Munich, March 10,
1965; "United About What?", The Economist, March 13, 1965.
183. Day Worker (London), March 15, 1965; De Waarheid
(Amsterdam), March 10, 1965; L'Unith, March 10, 195; see William
McLaughlin, "West Europe CP's and the Conference," RFE/Munich,
March 23, 1965.
184. "An Important Step Toward the Consolidation of the
World Communist Movement," Pravda, March 11, 1965.
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The Chinese Response
1. The March 4 Moscow Student Demonstration. If the parti-
cipants in the Moscow 18-party meeting had any illusions left about
Peking's response to their efforts, these must have been swept
away by the violent March 4 demonstration by Chinese and Vietnamese
students against the American Embassy in Moscow. In view of its
timing and of subsequent developments, it is most probable that
this demonstration was staged by the Chinese Embassy in Moscow on
orders from Peking. (It bore many resemblances to the 1963 Naushki
incident. )185
On March 4 several hundred Chinese students led Vietnamese and
other students in storming Soviet police lines before the American
Embassy. Serious fighting broke out, and many were injured on both
sides; Soviet mounted police, in scenes reminiscent of Cossack
charges under the Tsars, unsuccessfully rode into the students in
order to disperse them; and only when several hundred Red Army
soldiers arrived did the students disperse.186 Peking violently
protested, alleging that Soviet police had tortured Chinese students
and that Soviet hospitals had refused to treat them, and demanding
that the Soviets "admit their errors," "apologize to the students,"
185. See Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 174-176.
186. The New York Times, March 5, 1965.
and "severly punish" the Soviet police Involved.c187 The Soviets
rejected, the prot)est, termed the demonstratocn a "premeditated
provocation " declared that any s.Imlar ones wouid be "resolutely
cut short.," and stated that international law required the Soviets
to protect foreign embass.es. The Ch.nese on March 16 sent
another note, agar demanding that Moscow "adit its mistakes" and.
apologize to the students, and added srcastcallyI
How ruthless you were to the demonstrators against
U.S. imperialsm, and how al jectly subservient you
were to the T5 imperialist1,89
When the injured, Chinese students returned to Peking, they were
received with all nor190 whereupon Moscow declared that they
were faking ther injuris and that the Ch.inese were concocting a
"propaganda farce.. " The violence of the Soviet protests was
probably in part due to the fact that this demonstration was the
first such -utbreak in the Soviet Union ot under the regime's con-
trol since 191, Howe-ver, the vicience of the Chinese response,
1.87. CPR note, Jen-min J7h-pao, March 7, 1965 quoted. from
Peking Review, VIII, 1 ~March 1 2965), p. 16
188. Sovinet note, Pravda, March 13, 1965; CDSP, XVII, .10
(March 31., 1965), pp. 4- 5
189. Jen.rmin Jih-pao, March 17, 1965, quoted from Peking
Review, VIII, 12 (March 1.9, 1965) pp 7- 8.
190 . ibid., pp. 8-9.
191. Pravda, March 21, 965, qioted from CDSP, XVII, 10(March 31, 1965) p. 6I
and the genuinely provocative nature of the demonstration and its
aftermath, fundamentally reflected the grave deterioration in
Sino-Soviet relations then under way.
Although the first official Chinese commentary on the confer-
ence did not appear until March 22, the Peking press had made clear
192
by reprinting alleged Soviet attacks on China and articles from
pro-Chinese parties that in Peking's view the conference represented
"Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and that Moscow was conspiring
with Washington to sell out the DRV's and the Viet Cong's inter-
193
ests. On March 20, in publishing the Moscow meeting communique,
Peking spoke of "a schismatic meeting convoked by the leadership of
the CPSU unilaterally, i1Legal.ly, and by scraping bits and pieces
together. " Then on March 22 Peking published "A Comment
on the March Moscow Meeting," a programmatic statement that marked
the death sentence for any Sino-Soviet reconciliation and signaled
the opening of a major Chinese campaign against the new Soviet
192. Pekingeview, VITII 10 (March 5, 1965), pp, 27-31, and
VIII, 11 (Mairch 12, T965) pp. 1-12. The Albanians again signaled
the Chinese position. On March 18 they declared that the March
Moscow conference "cf hardened conspirators 0 decisively tore
the mask from the present Soviet leadership. 0 0 Alongside N.
Khrushchev and with hij they are the greatest plotters and split-
ters the history of the international Communist movement had known,
revisionists and incorrigible renegades of Marxist-Leninism, allies
and auxiliaries of imperialismi" (Zeri i Popullit, March 18, 1965.)
193. Jen-min Jih-pao, March 9, 10, 12, and 13, 1965. See
also the introduction to the 3rd volume of Khrushchev's works,
Peking Review, VIII, 10 (March 5, 1965), pp. 11-12.
194. Quoted from Peking Review, VIII, 13 (March 26, 1965),
pp. 17-18; SCMP 3423, March 24, 1965, p. 36.
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leadership. The meeting, it declared, was "illegal and schismatic
guite small and most unseetrdy . . . a gloomy and forlorn
affair"--ie. a fiasco. It was "rent with contradictions and dis-
unity": some "wholeheartedly" supported Moscow., some "halfheartedly"
e
.
g. the Italians some were only a "claque"; and "still others"
the Cubans? "may have temporarily fallen into the trap from
naivete.," The new Soviet leadership, the article continued, was
continuing "Khrushchevism o . , revisionism, great power chauvinism,
and splittism 0 " They removed Khrushchev only because he was too
"odious" and "stupid":
0 0 . all their fine words only amount to selling
horsemeat as beefstead. o . . they are saying one
thing and, doing another . . . they are still bent
on deepening the differences, wrecking unity, and
0 0 0 openly splitting the international Communist
movement. I .
The meeting's proposal for "concerted action" agains$ the
imperialists was also a "swindle'," for "they continue to adhere to
Khrushchev's reactionary policy of Soviet-UoS. cooperation for the
domination of the world"- -i e they will not break with Washington
and support Chinese policy. Specifically, the article went on,
Moscow is willing to compromise on the United Nations Article 19
controversy and to join with Washington to set up a U.N. peace
keeping force; the Soviets want negotiation instead of struggle
in Vietnam; they are continuing their attempts to subvert the
Japanese, Indonesian, and Burmese Communist parties; and they con-
tinue Khrushchev's "erroneous" policies toward Albania and their
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alignment with Tito. Finally,
To sum up, what the new leaders of the CPSU
have been doing can be described as "three shams
and three realities": sham anti-imperialism but
real capitulationism, sham revolution but real
betrayal, sham unity but a real split. They are
still doing what Khrushchev did . . . "four
alignments with and. four alignments against":
alignment with imperialism against socialism,
alignment with the United States against China
and the other revolutionary countries, alignment
with the reactionaries everywhere against the
national-liberation movements and. the people's
revolutions, and. alignment with the Tito clique
and renegades of all descriptions against all
the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and all
revolutionaries fighting imperialism. . . .
Rather than end-ing polemics, the modern revisionists must be
refuted publicly, even if it takes "ten thousand years." Moreover
the Moscow meeting created "new and serious obstacles" for an in-
ternational meeting, the preparation for which will now take not
four or five years but "twice as long, or even longer"--i.e. China
will indefinitely refuse to participate. As a precondition for
"concerted action against the enemy and unity against imperialism,"
Moscow must publicly repudiate the meeting, "Khrushchev's revi-
sionism, great power chauvinism, and splittism," the Twentie th and
Twenty-Second CPSU Congresses, and "all the words and deeds of the
leaders of the CPSU against China, Albania, the Japanese Communist
Party and the other Marxist-Leninist parties." As for China, the
article concluded,--and this was its most important point--the
Moscow meeting has given the "Marxist-Leninist parties . . . the
right to take the initiative",
we havie not given enough support to the revo-
lutionary left in scrme counries and, henceforth must
greatly intensify cur endeavors in this respect I
In sum, then, Peking def ied the new Soviet leadership, refused
to cooperate with it on the Vietnamese or any other issue, and I
announced. the intensification of its an-i=Scviet factional activity
throughout the international Comnunist movemento '
After the Moscew Meeting:,
The Further Worsening of Sino-Soviet Relations
As of this writing (June 15, 1965) Sino-Soviet relations have
continued to worsen ever since the March 1965 Moscow meeting.
Peking has intensified its offensive against Moscow in all direc-
tions and has continued to center its attack on the Vietnam issue.
Although the Chinese propaganda position has teen made more diffi-
cult by the further hardening of Soviet policy and by increased
American willingness to negotiate, Peking has stubbornly maintained
that Moscow continues to plot with Washington to sell out Hanoi.
Thus each time that Moscow has tried to diminish although not
eliminate, its differences with Peking by increasing Soviet hos-
tility to Washington, Peking (and Banoi) have fu rther hardened their
195. "A Comment on the Moscow Meeting " Jen-min Jih-pao and.
Hung Ch'i, March 22, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, VII 13
(March 26, 1965), pp. 7-13 Etalics in origina1c Cfa j. c. k.
_foseph C. Kun, "Chinese to Increase Factionalism and Continue
Polemics," RFE/Munich, March 22, 1965. It was preceded on March 18
by a similar Zerii Pohp.it editoria, "The Splitting Revisionist
Meeting of 1 March-A Great Piot Against Marxism-Leninism and
International Communism ."
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positions. This Soviet response has paralleled Washington's reduc-
tion of most of the conditions it had previously attached to
negotiation centering on Vietnam,a step which in turn has made the
Soviet position more difficult.
One point of caution must be mad.e: at the level of military
policy, where events in Vietnam are increasingly determined, both
Moscow and Peking have continued. their caution in the face of ex-
tended American bombings of North Vietnam and, beginning in April,
increased commitment of American ground troops to South Vietnam.
Although in April Moscow for the first time explicitly stated its
willingness in principle to send Soviet volunteers to North Viet-
nam, the commitment was carefully qualified and made clearly
applicable only to a future contingency, not present policy: "if
. . . U.S. aggression is intensified . . 0 if need be, and if the
DRV government so requests. . . ."196 Likewise, in early May
Peking's Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ching, in an otherwise belligerent
article, repeated Mao's January formulation that "we will not
attack unless we are attacked. "1 97
196. See the joint USSR-DRV communique, Pravda, April 18,
1965, quoted from CDSP, XVII, 16 (May 12, 1965), pp. 14-15, at p.
13. See also the Kosygin speech, Pravda, April 20, 1965. Brezhnev
had earlier (ibid., March 24, 1965), apparently in response to a
March 22 NLF request for volunteers, hinted that Soviet volunteers
might be sent.
197. Lo Jui-ching, a. cit.
118
President Johnson's April 7 offer of "unconditional negotia-
198
tions" was answered by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong the following
day, April 8, with a four-point program clearly unacceptable to
Washington: (1) immediate and total American withdrawal from South
Vietnam, (2) no foreign troops in either North or South thereafter
(i.e. no UN or other peace keeping force), (3) South Vietnamese
affairs to be settled without foreign intervention according to the
NLF (Viet Cong) program, and (4) peaceful unification of Vietnam
with no foreign interventiono 9 9 True, Moscow also rejected.
Johnson's proposals and endorsed Pham's,2O but it did so less en-
thusiastically, while Peking had even before insisted on the one
point Johnson was unwilling to concede: that Washington could
negotiate only with the NLFO201 Moreover, although Moscow's atti-
tude hardened and in mid-March the Soviet government refused to
join London in proposing a cease-fire in Vietnam,202 China reportedly
at least temporarily held up Soviet aid going to Hanoi,203 refused
198. The New York Times, April 8, 1,965,
199. Text: ibid. , April 14, 1965-
200. "What's All the Fuss About," Pravda, April 10, 1965.
201. See Chou En-lails message, via Algiers, to U Thant,
The New York Times, April 7, 1965; Chen Yi's interview with K. S.
Karol, Peking Review, VIII, 23 (June 4, 1965), pp0 14-15-
202. Pierre from Moscow in Le Monde, March 19, 1.965; The
Times (London), March 7, 1965.
203. Tanner from Moscow in The New York Times, March 29, 1965.
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(as did Hanoi) to allow a visit from London's special envoy Patrick
Gordon-Walker,204 declared that "Khrushchev's successors are pur-
suing the Khrushchev line to form an anti-China alliance with
Nehru's successors,"205 exploded a second atomic bomb,206 denounced
the 17-nation nonaligned appeal as one "masterminded and created by
the Tito clique,"207 and sabotaged the attempt--to which the Soviets
had agreed--to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Cambodia as a
means of beginning informal negotiations on Vietnam.20 8
Meanwhile Peking's polemics against Moscow became constantly
sharper. Perhaps the most substantively significant was a long
article by Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching. By declaring that the
Maoist strategy of "active defense should not have the holding or
capturing of territory as its major objective" and by reaffirming
204. Lewis from London in ibid., April 13, 1965.
205. "Observer," "What Shastri's Soviet Trip Reveals,"
Jen-min Jih-pao, May 27, 1965, quoted from Peking Review, VIII, 23
(June 4, 1965), pp. 17-19, at p. 19.
206. Communique of May 14, 1965, in ibid., VIII, 21 (May 21,
1965), p. 6.
207. "A Comment on the 17-Nation Appeal," Jen-min Jih-pao,
April 22, 1965, quoted from Peking Review VIII, 18 (April 30, 1965),
pp. 10-12.
208. Originally Cambodia had requested the convening, but
only to guarantee its neutrality, on March 15; of the two co-chair-
men, Moscow agreed on April 3 and London on April 26. By that time
London was hoping to use the conference to negotiate on Vietnam,
whereupon Moscow hesitated, and Sihanouk presumably under Chinese
pressure, on April 24 declared that not Saigon but the NLF must
represent South Vietnam, thus ending the project. See Tanner from
Moscow in The New York Times, April 15, 28, 1965; The Times (London),
April 27, 1965; and a CPR government statement, May 2, 1965, in
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the superiority of men and revolutionary fervor over weapons and
atom bombs, he seemed almost to be implying that Hanoi should
accept maximum American bombing and, continue fighting indefinitely.
More generally he made the case against Soviet caution in its
support of Hanoi, because of its interest in avoiding a confronta-
tion with Washington, a criterion of the rightness of Soviet
policy:
. Countries which have won victory should sup-
port and help the revolutionary struggles of those
countries and peoples that have not yet won victory.
The socialist countries should serve as base areas
for the world revolution. . . . Whether or not a
country which has won victory dares to serve as a
base area for the world revolution and to support
and aid the people's revolution in other countries
is the touchstone of whether or not it is really
for revolution and whether or not it really op-
poses imperialism . . 209
The spring of 1965 saw intensified Sino-Soviet propaganda
battles at various international Communist front organization
Peking Review, VIII, 19 (May 7, 1965), pp. 11-12, a commentary on
a May 1 Cambodian government statement
209. Lo Jui-ching, a,. cit For other anti-Soviet attacks,
see "A Great Victory for Leninism," Hung Ch 2 i, No. 4, April 1965,
in Peking Review, VIII., 19 (May T, 1965)9 pp. 7-10; "The Historical
Experience of the War Against Fascism," Jen-min Jih-pao, May 9,
1965, in Peking Review, and statements by Chen Yi and P'eng Chen,
in a Hong Kong dispatch in The New York Times, May 30, 1965.
121
meetings in Algiers210 and. Accra,211 further conflict between the
pro-Chinese Japanese Communist Party and Soviet-supported Japanese
Communist dissidents and the pro-Soviet left wing of the Japanese
Socialist Party,212 plus Chinese protests against Soviet expulsion
of Chinese students in Moscow 2 1 and prevention of a North Vietnam-
ese student protest in Leningrad.214 Furthermore Peking continued.
its efforts to exclude the Soviet Union and Malaysia from the
second Bandung Conference, scheduled for late June in Algiers.21 5
210. At the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar, February 22-28,
1965, and the Fourth International Teachers Conference, April 8-18
(NCNA English, April 21, 1965, 1901 GMT).
211. At the April 15-21 WFDY meeting (NCNA English May 2,
1965, 2041 GMT) and the May Fourth AAPSO Conference (NCNA
English, May 9, 1965, 1905 GMT; May 18, 2200 GMT); "Hold Still
Higher the Afro-Asian People's Revolutionary Barrier of Solidarity
Against Imperialism," Jen-min Jih-pao, May 19, 1965, in
SCMP, 3464, May 25, 15p 55-23;
b o cf Liao Cheng-chih, ibid. , VIII, 21 (May 21, 1965), pp. 14-
17; resolution, ibid.., pp. 17-19; Hsien Pien, "Success of the
Fourth Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference," ibid., VIII, 22
(May 28, 1965), pp. 13-15; resolution on Vietnam, ibid.,, pp. 15-16.
212. Akahata, April 2, 14, l965.
213. In an April 13 Chinese Foreign Ministry memorandum to
the Soviet embassy in Peking, NCNA English, May 5, 1965, 1741 GMT.
214. NCNA English, May 6, 1965, 1301 GMT. Hanoi did not make
any reference to the incident.
215. E.g., Grose from Moscow in The New York Times, June 13,
1965.
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Since late January 1965, then, after the fleeting pause sub-
sequent to Khrushchev's fall., Sino-Soviet relations had worsened
again. The basic causes of the dispute, and the depth of differ-
ences and emotional involvement on both sides, made Khrushchev's
successors as unsuccessful as he in either containing or isolating
the Chinese. On the contrary, their influence continued to decline.
Moreover, American escalation in Vietnam further exacerbated
Sino-Soviet relations.
Why this was the case has already been described; it remains
only to set forth the manner in which the Vietnam issue, added on
top of all the other Sino-Soviet strains, led the Chinese to openly
accuse the Soviets of conspiring with the Americans to sell out
Hanoi.
As has been so frequently the case in the course of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, Tirana preceded Peking in the public accusation,
although one may assume that Peking had already made the charge
privately and that the only decision which remained for the Chinese
was when to publicly denounce the Soviets on this score. On April
20 the Albanians declared:
0 . The diabolical aim of the . . . Brezhnev-
Kosygin-Mikoyan-Suslov group .- o is to get the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam into their snare by
undertaking an operation allegedly to send arms and
volunteers into that country. . . . This action . . .
is accompanied by American bombings, which decrease
only with the conclusion of the Soviet operation--
that is, when so-called Soviet "volunteers," as
alleged experts. rocket technicians, etc., have
occupied key places in Vietnam,
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Thus, the Soviet revisionists hope and
endeavor to create a favorable, relatively calm
situation for negotiations with the Americans, and
to turn Vietnam and Indochina into a base for plots
and threats against the Chinese Peoples' Republic.
216
In late May and mid-June Peking adopted substantially the same
217position, first in a speech at the PKI Higher Party School by
P'eng Ch'en and then, even more extensively and authoritatively,
in a long editorial article,218 (The latter, published on the
second anniversary of the Chinese June 13, 1963 "25 points,"
will be the basis of analysis here, with some additions from
P'eng's speech when necessary.)
The June 13, 1965 article began by reiterating the thesis of
,,2 19
the ninth "Comment" that Kharushchevs social base was "the new
privileged bourgeois stratum." This same stratum, the new article
added, "got rid of Khrushchev" because he was "too stupid and.
disreputable" and therefore "endangered their dominant position."
His replacements, the article continued., has been Khrushchev's
closest associates, were fundamentally associated with his whole
216. "The Traitorous Group of Soviet Revisionists Supports
American Imperialists in Their Aggression Against Vietnam," Z.eri i
Popullit, April 20, 1965,
217. P'eng Ch'en in Peking Review, VIl, 24 (June 11, 1965),
p. 20.
218. "Carry the Struggle Against Khrushchev Revisionism
Through to the End," Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, June 13, 1965,
in Peking Review , II 25 (Jiune. 18, 1965), pp. 5-10.
219. See pp. 66-68 supra.
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revisionist line, and, lke him, represent the "privileged. bour-
geois stratum" and therefore "can only act in conformity with the
interests of that stratum arid pursue a revisionist line.
(In other words., the new Soviet leadership must be revisionist.)
They are "old actors" "who face the . . , awkward and difficult
problem of how to deck themselves out as new ones." Therefore
they face an insoluble contradiction: they profess revolution but
practice "Soviet-U.S. cooperation" against revolution. They
practice therefore, ", c . compared to Khrushchev, a more covert,
more cunning, and more dangerous revisionism. , . ." (P'eng Ch'en
went even further, implicitly applying to the new Soviet leadership
the formulation of Lenin and. of the 1949 Cominform Resolution:
0 . Objectively they are a poltical detachement
of the bourgeoisie its agents in the labor
movement. 
.-
I
clearly implying that they are even worse than Sukarno and Norodom
Sihanouk:
they really cannot be compared. with the anti-
imperialist and revolutionary representatives of the
national bourgeoisie in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, nor even with the anti-imperialist andI
patriotic representatives of royal families and the
nobility . .I 
The article accused the new Soviet leadership of continuing
Khrushchev's anti-Albanian and pro-Indian policies, and of trying
to subvert the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties,, Worse,
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While making some gesture of aid to Vietnam,
they have divulged their "aid" plans to the Americans
in advance and have been busy in Washington, London,
and Paris trying to bring about peace negotiations in
a painstaking effort to find a "way out" for the U.S.
aggressors. . . .
The article then turned to a Soviet argument which, one sus-
pects, has probably been causing the Chinese some trouble: "unity
against imperialism." The Soviets, the article declared., preach
"unity," in spite of having disrupted unity by "brazenly calling
the schismatic March meeting."' Moreover,
they have a despicable aim. to capitalize on
the aspirations of the people of the world for . . .
closer unity . , . in the face of the U.S. imperi-
alists' rabid aggression. 0
The article concluded:
We therefore must continue our triumphant pursuit
and firmly carry forward. the fight against 220
Khrushchev revisionism to the very end. .
The Soviets had long been patient in the face of the rising
post-March Chinese polemics, but, predictably, their patience--or
was it, perhaps, their hesitation to act--gave way. P'eng Ch'en's
speech proved too much for Moscow to bear, and upon its departure
the Soviet delegation to the PKI 45th anniversary celebration issued
220. P'eng (p. 18) modified this somewhat (but presumably
only for tactical purposes) by prefacing the same statement with:
"We still place some hope in the leadership of the CPSU, and will
welcome the day when they admit and rectify their mistakes. . . .
But it seems that this day is still far off.,"
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a statement accusing P'eng of having made "provocative and slander-
ous" attacks on CPSU policy and the Soviet government and expres-
sing regret that such a "remarkable" occasion should. have been
used. by the Chinese for their "splitting purposes. "2 2 1
But the Soviets were i, if anything, a worse--albeit basically
the same--dilemma as before, They published a Portuguese Communist
Party resolution calling for an international conference;222 yet
simultaneously tried to accomodate reluctant. Soviet supporters
within the international Communist movement by indicating that no
new international organizational form should be set up and that
formally decisions of an international conference are not binding
on its members, quoting Lenin. to the effect that
The moral significance of the decisions of an
international conference is such that non-observance
is 6n exception in practice. .223
Moreover, the Portuguese CP resolutlon both supported. the conclu-
sions of the March 1 meeting and stressed that:
It is known that communist and workers parties differ
in their views as to the forms and methods of over-
coming the existing differences, the resolution says.
In the majority of cases this difference reflects the
striving of each party to make its own constructive
221. Pravda, June 7, 1965,.
222. Ibid., June 13, 1965I
223. Ye. Bugayev in Partiinaya Zhizn, No- 7, 1965 (quoting
Lenin, Sochineniya, XIII, pp. 6 ,cited from r. r g. fI Rock-
ingham Gill , "B and, K Against a Second Cominform," RFE/Munich,
June 1, 19 5.
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contribution toward the restoration and consolida-
tion of the unity of the international communist
movement.
Yeanwhile the head. of a PCI delegation had declared upon his re-
turn from Hanoi:
The Vietnamese Party of Labor is one of the
parties which did not take part in the Moscow Confer-
ence, and disagrees with the CPSU and, in fact, with
us as well, on the advisability of participating in
this conference; but we found a common ground, and
what seemed important to us and which should be re-
corded here as well, is that they not only expressed
their interest, their sympathy--as the party secre-
tary put it--with the last words Comrade Togliatti
left us, but that they consider the watchwords
stressed. in Togliatti's testament- -unity in diversity--
to be a watchword which should. be adopted by the
whole Communist movement and which in any event the
Party of Labor accepts as a watchword., as a direction
which had value for it. . . .22
That such assurances were necessary can be seen in the Cuban-Italian
communique repeating of Berlinguerls March formulations about
new forms of unity, solidarity, and coopera-
tion for the whole world revolutionary and working-
class movement, based, on equality, independence of
judgment and respect for the norms that should
regulate relations between all the Marxist-Leninist
parties. .225
224. Giancarlo Pajetta in L'Unit'a, May 20, 1965, quoted from
JPRS 30, 437, June 7, 1965, pp. 17t P. 5
225. PURS-PCI communique, Havana, June 4, 1965, in L'Unita,
June 9, 1965, quoted from Kevlin Devlin, "The Rome-Havana Entente,"
RFE/Munich, June 12, 19658
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Peking, to whom any opposition to a Soviet-staged conference
was welcome, could only be triumphant. Moscow, on the other hand.,
was showing signs of resuming anti-Chinese polemics and, perhaps,
of once again attempting to rally support against Peking. But if
Khrushchev could not get rid of the spirits of disunity he had
summoned up, how, after their March 1965 Moscow fiasco, could
Brezhnev and Kosygin?
